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Graham and Harvey’s (2001) survey evidence and Baker, Greenwood, and 
Wurgler (2003) indicate that firm managers try to time debt markets based on term 
spreads or excess bond returns when choosing the maturity of new debt issues.  Whether 
debt market timing increases firm value via a reduced cost of capital is an empirical 
question.  I examine differences in firm value across non-timers and timers, where timers 
are defined as firms that follow either a naïve strategy of choosing long-term debt when 
the term premium is low or a complex strategy from Baker et al. (2003) based on the 
predictability of future excess bond returns.  Also, I combine a debt maturity function and 
a complex timing strategy to obtain a better classification of timers.  Timers are assumed 
to choose different maturity from the predictions of the debt maturity function to follow a 
complex strategy.   
First, I investigate whether the timing strategies affect the share price response to 
announcements of straight debt offerings.  I find no evidence that timing strategies affect 
share price responses to announcements of debt offering.  Second, I investigate whether 
timers have higher firm value than non-timers, as measured by Tobin’s q.  After 
controlling for various determinants of firm value, I find no differences in firm value 
between them.  Third, I investigate whether firm value for timers increases more than that 
for non-timers after the debt issues.  I find no differences in changes in value between 
them. 
In addition, I consider that firms could have private information about their future 
credit quality and use the information to time debt markets.  Timers issue short-term 






timers have lower firm value than non-timers.  This result is consistent with previous 
findings that bond ratings changes follow financial and operational abnormal 
performance, and thus investors are able to predict bond ratings changes.  Overall, 
although firms apparently try to time debt markets using market interest rates or future 
credit quality, they fail to increase firm value.  The results suggest that corporate debt 

























Modigliani and Miller (1958) show that in perfect and integrated capital markets 
financial policy is irrelevant in valuing a firm.  Their key insight is that firm value is not 
related to the firm’s capital structure with assumptions of perfect capital markets.  In 
contrast to Modigliani and Miller’s propositions, some studies find that managers can 
successfully time equity markets when they have private information.1  Relaxing the 
assumptions of perfect capital markets, the studies assume that the managers are better 
informed about their future earnings than investors.  Then, firm managers can implement 
timing strategy such that they issue equity when the firm is overvalued and avoid issuing 
equity when the firm is undervalued.  Consistent with the studies, Loughran and Ritter 
(1995) and Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) show that seasoned equity offering (SEO) 
firms under-perform various benchmarks by about 30 percent on average over the three 
to five-year period after the issue.  Loughran and Ritter (1995) argue that the long-run 
underperformance of equity issuers is consistent with the idea that managers issue equity 
when equity is overvalued.  This evidence indicates that firms are successful in timing 
equity markets, and also suggests that there exist some inefficiencies in equity markets.   
Recent studies focus on debt market timing strategies.  Graham and Harvey 
(2001) survey evidence show that financial managers tend to choose maturity based on 
term spreads when they issue new debt securities.  The survey evidence is consistent with 
empirical findings in Barclay and Smith (1995) and Guedes and Opler (1996) that debt 
                                                 







maturity is negatively related to term spreads.  If the managers have better information 
about future movements of interest rates than investors, they can issue long-term debt 
when term spread is too low and issue short-term debt when term spread is too high.   
Whether this timing strategy decreases overall cost of capital is an empirical question.  In 
perfect and integrated capital markets, there should not be any gain associated with 
switching between short-term and long-term debt.  Suppose that a firm has a fixed 
leverage ratio, and it tries to time debt markets by switching between short- and long-
term debt based on market conditions.  If timing strategies can decrease the overall cost 
of its debt by changing maturities of debt securities, then it means that these strategies 
should increase the cost of equity because Modigliani and Miller theorem applies in the 
integrated markets and implies that the overall cost of capital should not change.  
Financial managers can decrease their cost of debt without changing cost of equity by 
timing debt markets only if markets are segmented because Modigliani and Miller 
theorem does not apply in segmented markets.  Successful debt market timing strategies 
would then imply that debt markets are not well integrated with equity markets.    
Baker, Greenwood, and Wurgler (2003) show that the share of long-term debt in 
total debt issues is largely explained by debt market conditions such as inflation, the real 
short term rate, and term spread, which also forecast excess bond returns.  They argue 
that firms use market conditions to determine the lowest-cost maturity at which they can 
borrow.  To explain their findings, they test whether the long-term share in debt issues is 
related to time-varying risk.  Since the long-term share is inversely related to predictable 
excess bond returns, it should also be inversely related to time-varying risk if the market 






related to various measures of risk. Their evidence is consistent with two possible 
explanations.  First, managers know when the cost of debt is low and can successfully 
time inefficient and segmented capital markets.  Second, managers try to time debt 
market, but the capital markets are efficient and integrated.  However, Baker et al. do not 
present direct evidence distinguishing between the two explanations.  Although their 
evidence indicates that firms try to time market interest rates, it does not address directly 
whether firms actually reduce their cost of capital and thereby increase firm value by debt 
market timing.    
Titman (2002) points out that the observed debt market timing strategies can 
increase firm value, only if the equity market and debt markets are not integrated.  If debt 
markets are inefficient and timing strategies are successful, one needs to explain why the 
inefficient debt markets can be exploited by only firm managers, which would require 
that firm managers are better informed than others about market interest rates.  He 
acknowledges that it is difficult to test whether firm managers can reduce the overall cost 
of capital by timing debt markets. 
In this dissertation, I test whether timing debt markets based on market interest 
rates or inside information about credit ratings increases the value of the firm, as 
measured by Tobin’s q.  By investigating the effect of timing strategies on firm value, I 
answer the unsolved problem in Baker et al. (2003) and Titman (2002) about whether 
managers successfully time debt market or managers try in vain to time an efficient debt 
markets. 
I classify short- and long-term debt issuers into timers and non-timers using term 






which tries to time debt markets using term spreads, or Baker et al.’s (2003) timing 
strategy (hereafter complex strategy), which tries to time debt markets using predicted 
excess bond returns.  Timers issue long-term debt when market interest rates (term 
spreads or excess bond returns) are relatively low, and issue short-term debt when market 
interest rates are high.  In contrast, non-timers issue short-term debt when market interest 
rates are relatively low, and issue long-term debt when market interest rates are high.  I 
also combine a debt maturity function in Guedes and Opler (1996) and a complex timing 
strategy to obtain a better classification of timers.  Timers are assumed to choose a 
different maturity from the predictions of the debt maturity function to follow a complex 
timing strategy based on one-year-ahead excess bond returns. 
In addition, I classify timers based on private information (future bond ratings 
changes).  Flannery (1986) presents a theoretical model in which firms issue short-term 
debt expecting their credit quality to improve, and firms issue long-term debt expecting 
their credit quality to deteriorate.  Timers are assumed to have private information about 
their rating changes within three years after the issuance of debt securities and use the 
information to choose maturity when they issue the debt securities. 
In this research, I test whether firm value differs between timers and non-timers.  
If timing strategies are successful and if capital markets discern whether firms are timers 
or non-timers, then timers should have higher firm value than non-timers even before 
timing strategies are implemented.  In a different scenario, the motivation of timers can 
be revealed to the markets after firms implement timing strategies.  To test this 
possibility, I examine the effect of timing strategies on stock price response to the 






have better information about future interest rates, timing strategies allow the timers to 
lock in lower interest rates.  Then, changes in interest rates will increase the firm value of 
timers more than that of non-timers.  To test this possibility, I investigate changes in q 
(from before to after the issuance of debt securities) across timers and non-timers. 
Using a sample of 1,423 straight long-term debt offerings with available 
announcement dates during 1983-1997, I investigate whether timing strategies affect the 
mean share price response to the announcements of the debt offerings.  For the full 
sample, the mean share price response is negative but is not significantly different from 
zero.  I find that the share price response for timers is not significantly different from that 
for non-timers regardless of how I classify timers.  Overall, timing strategies based on 
market interest rates or future bond ratings change do not affect the mean share price 
response to the announcements of straight debt offerings. 
Then, I test whether timers have higher firm value than non-timers.  I use q as a 
measure of firm value.  Theoretically, q is defined as the ratio of the market value of the 
firm to the replacement costs of its assets.  In this research, I use two different measures 
of q.  Following Chung and Pruitt (1994), I use the market value of equity, the book value 
of long-term debt, and the book value of assets (a proxy for the replacement costs of its 
assets) to calculate q (hereafter C-P q).  Also, I use the market value of long-term debt 
instead of the book value of long-term debt for the firms with available bond prices to re-
calculate q (hereafter New q).  Using a sample of 5,487 short- or long-term debt issuers 
over the period 1983-1997, I find no significant differences across timers and non-timers 
in firm value, regardless of whether I assume they follow a naïve timing strategy or a 






firm value.2   The results remain the same even after controlling for size, leverage effect, 
dividend policy, bond ratings, and inside ownership. Then, I examine whether any 
increase in firm value would show up after the issuance of debt securities by comparing 
the changes in q between timers and non-timers.  Again, I find no significant differences 
between timers and non-timers. 
I do find one interesting result when I classify timers based on future rating 
changes.  I follow bond ratings changes during the three years after the debt issues.  The 
debt issuers are classified as timers if short-term debt issuers experience credit quality 
improvement or if long-term debt issuers experience credit quality deterioration during 
the three-year period.  I find that timers have lower firm values than non-timers in the 
year of or one year before they issue the debt securities.  To investigate this result further, 
I divide the timers into firms with upgrades and firms with downgrades.  The result 
shows that timers issuing short-term debt expecting upgrades do not have significantly 
different firm value than non-timers.  In contrast, timers issuing long-term debt expecting 
downgrades have significantly lower value than non-timers.  In addition, timers issuing 
long-term debt expecting downgrades lose firm value significantly more than non-timers 
during the year when they implement the timing strategy.  This result is consistent with 
the findings in Pinches and Singleton (1978) and Holthausen and Leftwich (1986).  They 
show that bond ratings changes follow abnormal financial and operational performance, 
and thus investors are able to predict bond ratings changes.  These results also imply that 
timers fail to reduce the overall cost of capital although they try to time debt market using 
seemingly private information.         
                                                 






 Overall, the results show that timing strategies do not affect the share price 
response to the announcements of straight debt offerings.  Regardless of whether timers 
use market interest rates or seemingly private information (future bond ratings changes), 
timers do not have higher firm value than non-timers or do not increase firm value more 
than non-timers.  That is, although firm managers try to time debt markets using public 
information or seemingly private information, they do not succeed in increasing firm 
value by reducing the overall cost of capital.  The results strongly suggest that corporate 






















LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
In perfect and fully integrated capital markets, Modigliani and Miller (1958, 
1963) demonstrate that firm value is independent of a firm’s capital structure.  Their main 
result is that the rewards for bearing relevant risks should be the same across securities.   
They show that if a levered firm and an unlevered firm are in the same risk class and they 
have identical cash flows, arbitrage opportunities make the market values of the levered 
firm and the unlevered firm equal.  With respect to securities issuance, their propositions 
imply that there should be no gain from switching between debt and equity or between 
short-term and long-term debt. 
            Stiglitz (1974) extends the argument of Modigliani and Miller’s theorem.  He 
shows that if the state space is spanned by the securities markets, then changes in 
maturity do not add value to the present set of investment opportunities available.  This 
theorem is based on a frictionless market with no taxes and no bankruptcy costs.  These 
classical models show that in a perfect market with no frictions, the debt-equity choice is 
of no consequence and the debt maturity choice is also not relevant for value maximizing 
financial managers.     
However, if the strict assumptions of frictionless markets are relaxed, changes in 
debt maturity could change firm value.  Numerous researchers show that debt maturity 
choice has important implications in the firm if they assume some frictions in the 
financial markets.  In this chapter, I explain how timing strategy in equity markets and 
timing strategy in debt markets are different, and why timing strategies in debt markets 






frictions in the financial markets are related to the debt maturity choice.  Based on this 
literature review, I develop the main hypotheses that I can test in this dissertation.   
2.1 Market Timing 
Previous studies support the proposition that firm managers tend to time equity 
markets based on asymmetric information between themselves and outside investors.  
Under asymmetric information, firms raising external capital face an adverse selection 
problem.  Assuming the existence of asymmetric information, Myers and Majluf (1984) 
and Myers (1984) develop the pecking order hypothesis that firms prefer internal capital 
to external capital.  Firm managers prefer less risky securities when they go to external 
markets.  Lucas and McDonald (1990) develop the equity-timing model based on 
asymmetric information.  Their model indicates that firms tend to issue equity after they 
experience a large and extended positive abnormal share price run-up.  Also, equity 
issues on average follow stock price increases in the market as a whole, and stock prices 
drop significantly on the announcement of an equity issue. 
The empirical evidence is consistent with the predictions suggested by equity 
timing models.  Korajczyk, Lucas, and McDonald (1991) show that because financial 
managers know that equity issues are associated with negative returns, they try to issue 
equity at a time of smaller information asymmetries.  They find that firms issue equity in 
times with relatively smaller firm-specific information asymmetries, e.g., immediately 
after an earnings announcement.  Similarly, Choe, Masulis, and Nanda (1993) find that 
firms offering seasoned equity experience less of a negative reaction to announcements in 
up markets than in down markets.  Jung, Kim, and Stulz (1996) investigate the ability of 






financial structure and the stock price reaction to its decisions.  In their model, they use 
the actual long-term post issue abnormal returns as a proxy for management’s 
expectations of future performance.  They find that firms underperforming the most are 
more likely to issue equity, but the result is not statistically significant.  As they suggest, 
their results do not support the timing model, possibly due to the low power of their test 
stemming from a relatively large cross-sectional standard deviation of post-issue 
performance and corresponding large standard errors.  They also find that firms without 
valuable investment opportunities and with debt capacity issue equity.  This evidence 
supports the agency model because equity issue for these types of firms enhances 
managerial discretion.  
Empirical research on the long-run performance of equity offerings also supports 
the timing hypothesis.  Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) 
show that SEO firms under-perform various benchmarks by about 30 percent on average 
over three to five-year periods after the issue.  Loughran and Ritter (1995) argue that the 
long-run underperformance of equity issuers is consistent with the idea that managers 
issue equity when equity is overvalued.   
 In a recent paper, Baker and Wurgler (2000) document that the aggregate share of 
equity issues relative to the sum of debt and equity issues for a specific year is a predictor 
of stock market performance for the subsequent year over the period of 1928-1997.  They 
suggest that the negative relation between equity share and stock market returns supports 
inefficiency or market timing.  They also investigate the effect of timing equity markets 






historical market valuations.  They conclude that market timing has a persistent effect on 
capital structure.     
 Recently, researchers document evidence suggesting that financial managers also 
try to time debt markets by switching between short- and long-term debt, conditional on 
market interest rates.  Graham and Harvey (2001) survey 392 CFOs about capital 
structure and the cost of capital.  Their results suggest that firm managers attempt to time 
debt market interest rates by switching between short-term and long-term debt.  They 
borrow short-term when they think that short-term interest rates are low relative to long-
term rates or vice versa.  The survey evidence is consistent with empirical evidence 
documented in the previous literature.  Barclay and Smith (1995) and Guedes and Opler 
(1996) find that debt maturity is negatively related to term spread.    
Baker, Greenwood, and Wurgler (2003) find that inflation, the real short-term 
rate, and the term spread predict excess bond returns, and the same variables also have 
predictive power in explaining the share of long-term debt in total debt issues.   That is, 
the share of long-term debt is negatively related to future excess bond returns.  They 
argue that the results are consistent with survey evidence that financial managers try to 
time debt market using market interest rates.  They suggest three possible explanations 
for their findings: (1) Rational investors, Rational managers.  Based on the assumption 
that the debt market is efficient and integrated with equity market, the long-term debt 
share in debt issues are correlated with time-varying excess bond returns.  This 
explanation suggests that timing debt markets cannot reduce the cost of capital.  (2) 
Rational managers, Irrational investors.  Managers can choose maturity when the cost is 






does this affect cost of capital?  (3) Irrational managers, Rational investors.  Managers 
try to time debt markets even though the capital markets are efficient and integrated.   
They test whether the long-term share in debt issues is related to time-varying risk.  Since 
the long-term share is inversely related to predictable excess bond returns, it should also 
be inversely related to time-varying risk if the market is efficient.  However, they fail to 
find supporting evidence that the long-term share is related to various measures of risk, 
and remove the first alternative from the possible explanations.  Also, they do not present 
direct evidence differentiating the second from the third explanation.  Therefore, although 
their evidence indicates that firms try to time market interest rates, it does not address 
directly whether firms actually reduce their cost of capital and thereby increase firm 
value by debt market timing. 
As Titman (2002) points out, the observed debt market timing strategies can 
increase firm value only if the equity market and debt markets are not integrated.   Based 
on Modigliani and Miller theorem, the required return premium associated with any risk 
is the same in both equity markets and debt markets if those markets are integrated.    
Suppose a firm has a fixed leverage ratio, and it tries to time debt markets by switching 
between short-term and long-term debt based on market conditions.  If timing strategies 
can decrease the overall cost of its debt, then it means that these strategies should 
increase the cost of equity because Modigliani and Miller theorem applies in the 
integrated markets and implies that the overall cost of capital is not changed.  Yet, 
Modigliani and Miller theorem does not apply in segmented markets.  Accordingly, if we 
find that timing debt markets can reduce the overall cost of capital, the results will 






In terms of information asymmetry, there exists a fundamental difference between 
debt market timing based on term spread or predicted excess bond returns, and equity 
market timing based on private information.  Managers try to time equity markets based 
on their private information about the future value of their firm, while managers usually 
try to time debt markets based on public information such as the term spread or 
predictable excess bond returns.   If managers do not have an informational advantage 
when they time debt markets, a timing strategy will not increase the firm value.   
In addition, firms may time debt markets based on their private information about 
their future credit ratings.  Firm managers can have better information about future 
changes of credit ratings of their firm.  Flannery (1986) shows that if firm managers are 
better informed than outside investors, they will choose to issue debt securities that are 
overvalued.  This theoretical result suggests that firm managers will issue short-term debt 
if they expect their ratings to improve, and vice versa.  If firms are subject to large 
informational asymmetries, the effect of timing debt markets based on private 
information on firm value may be significant.  Graham and Harvey (2001) provide survey 
evidence that only a small percentage of firms borrow short-term because they expect 
their credit rating to improve. 
Whether firm managers can reduce their firms’ costs of capital by timing debt 
markets is testable.  Although previous literature shows that firm managers tend to time 
debt markets, it does not tell us directly whether they have a successful timing ability.  As 
Baker et al. (2003) point out, the evidence of timing debt markets suggests that managers 
time a segmented and inefficient debt market or that managers try to time an efficient 






directly whether timing debt markets based on market interest rates or inside information 
about credit ratings increases the value of the firm. 
2.2 Agency Costs of Debt and Debt Maturity 
Agency problems might exist when a principal employs an agent to perform a 
service on his or her behalf.  These problems arise from conflicts of interests between the 
principal and the agent.  The argument that agency costs of debt influences maturity of 
corporate debt has been well recognized theoretically and empirically.  Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) argue that debt creates certain incentive effects.  In their model, the firm 
owner can transfer wealth from bondholders to himself as equity holder by selling bonds 
with a promise to take less risky projects and then actually take riskier projects.  With 
risky debt outstanding, the equity holder can be viewed as holding a European call option 
on the total value of firm with an exercise price equal to the face value of debt.  Because 
the value of the call option increases with the risk of underlying assets, the equity holder 
has the incentive to take riskier projects.  Therefore, bondholders try to include various 
covenants in the indenture to limit the managerial behavior that results in reductions in 
the value of bonds.  That is, the owner-manager bears the agency costs associated with 
debt issuance eventually in the model.   
Myers (1977) models an incentive problem associated with debt overhang.  In the 
model, the value of the firm as a going concern depends on its future investment strategy.  
When debt matures after the firm’s investment option expires, managers who want to 
maximize shareholder value can have incentives to make sub-optimal investment 
decisions.  The managers may pass up positive net present value projects in some future 






the creditors in the model.  In some future states, any promised payments to debt-holders 
may lead the firm to abandon a project with positive net present value.  Thus, the firm 
with risky debt outstanding cannot capture the full benefits from exercise of the 
investment options because they accrue partially to debt-holders.  Myers (1977) argues 
that shortening debt maturity might mitigate the incentive problem because managers and 
debt-holders can re-contract before the growth options are exercised.  If debt matures 
prior to the exercise of the investment option, the agency problem can be eliminated.  He 
predicts that firms with greater growth opportunities, which may experience greater 
underinvestment problems, have incentives to use short-term debt.  Also, he predicts that 
firms with greater growth opportunities have lower leverage.   
Previous empirical findings are consistent with this prediction.  For instance, 
Barclay and Smith (1995) and Guedes and Opler (1996) find empirically a negative 
relation between debt maturity and growth opportunities.  Using data from 1965 to 1985, 
Smith and Watts (1992) document that firms with more growth options have lower 
leverage, lower dividend yields, higher executive compensation, and greater use of stock-
option plans.  Using international data from G-7 countries, Rajan and Zingales (1995) 
find a negative correlation between the proxy for growth opportunities (market to book 
ratio) and leverage in most countries.  Also, Johnson (1997) documents that growth 
opportunities are associated with debt choice among the firms.  He finds that there is no 
relation between the use of public debt and growth opportunities, a positive relation 
between use of private debt and growth opportunities, and a negative relation between the 






Bodie and Taggart (1978) argue that the existence of non-callable long-term debt 
in a firm’s capital structure will give managers an incentive for risk shifting in the 
presence of growth opportunities.  If the firm has non-callable risky debt in its capital 
structure, bondholders will share with stockholders in the profitable future investments 
thus reducing the firm’s incentive to invest in positive NPV projects in the future.  This 
incentive problem rationalizes the existence of the call provision because stockholders 
might be able to receive all of the gains from their discretionary powers over future 
investment opportunities by calling the long-term debt.  
Also, Barnea, Haugen, and Senbet (1980) argue that shortening the maturity of 
debt and issuing long-term debt with a call provision play the same role in eliminating 
those agency problems mentioned in the above.  In their model, the call feature mitigates 
the wealth transfer problem to the extent that the true nature of the firm is revealed before 
the maturity of the debt.  Also, short-term debt might mitigate the asset substitution 
incentive since the prices of short-term debt are less sensitive to risk shifting compared to 
those of long term debt.   
2.3 Asymmetric Information and Debt Maturity 
When there is no asymmetric information between outside investors and firm 
insiders, the securities of a firm will be priced correctly regardless of its financial 
structure.  However, if insiders have better information than outside investors, they will 
choose to issue the securities that are overvalued most in the market.  Because outside 
investors know this motivation of insiders, they can infer insiders’ information from the 






Some researchers develop signaling models showing that there exists a relation 
between debt maturity and borrowers’ private information about their credit quality.  
Financial managers can have better information about future changes in credit ratings of 
their firm.  Flannery (1986) shows that if financial managers are better informed than 
outside investors, they will choose to issue debt securities that are overvalued.  This 
theoretical result suggests that financial managers will issue short-term debt if they 
expect their ratings to improve, and long-term if they expect them to worsen.  In his two-
period signaling model, a separating equilibrium obtains if there are additional 
transaction costs to issuing short-term debt.  The extra costs prevent bad firms from 
mimicking good firms.  Then, good firms issue short-term debt to signal their inside 
information about firm quality, and only bad firms issue long-term debt.  Kale and Noe 
(1990) show that a separating equilibrium can also be obtained with no transaction costs 
when changes in firm value are positively correlated over time.  Provided that a Good 
type firm’s cash flows are correlated, the Bad-type firm will suffer mispricing losses if it 
mimics the Good firm by issuing short-term debt at period zero.  In the setting, after the 
Bad firm is priced as the Good firm, it will have a higher default risk premium if it has a 
lower realization at period one.  Because of this higher default risk premium and 
positively correlated cash flows, the Bad firm will avoid mimicking the Good firm.  
Then, the Good firm will issue short-term debt and the Bad firm will issue long-term 
debt.         
Robbins and Schatzberg (1986) argue that the papers based on agency costs, like 
Bodie and Taggart (1978) and Barnea, Haugen, and Senbet (1980), have not succeeded in 






information among the firm’s managers, and assume that managers have no other source 
of compensation than that paid by the firm’s owners, which is based on the firm’s 
residual value.  First, they show that issuing either callable bonds or short-term debt is an 
effective mechanism for signaling good prospects.  Neither equity nor non-callable debt 
fails to achieve a separating equilibrium because non-callable debt or equity does not 
provide for financial recontracting once the firm’s prospects are revealed.  When 
managers have poorer inside information, they will choose to issue equity over non-
callable debt because doing so reduces risk to their compensation.  Second, they show 
that by choosing callable debt, managers can signal their inside information and also 
reduce their risk.  If the firm issues callable bonds, it retains a moderate amount of its 
earnings in all states of the world and its residual value is stabilized.  The managers who 
have compensation contracts based on the firm’s residual value should choose callable 
bonds over short-term debt.      
Several papers, e.g., Bodie and Taggart (1978), Barnea, Haugen, and Senbet 
(1980), and Robbins and Schatzberg (1986), indicate that short-term debt or callable debt 
can mitigate agency costs, and might be an effective mechanism to signal managers’ 
private information.  They imply that long-term non-callable debt should be a dominated 
security.  However, I find in this research that more than 50 percent of long-term bonds 
issued over the sample period 1983-1997 do not have call provisions, which is not 
consistent with the arguments of these papers. 
Titman (1992) also extends Flannery’s (1986) research.  His model assumes that 
interest rates are uncertain and interest rate swaps are available.  When interest rates are 






financial distress costs.  He shows that some firms try to reduce uncertainty about future 
interest expenses due to high financial distress costs.  The main result of the paper is that 
the firms, which have favorable information, borrow short-term and use swaps to hedge 
interest rate risk.         
2.4 Liquidity Risk and Debt Maturity 
Firms may face higher liquidity risk when they choose short-term debt.  Short-
term debt can create liquidity risk because lenders ignore the borrower’s control rents and 
are unwilling to refinance when bad news arrives.  Diamond (1991) analyzes debt 
maturity choice as a tradeoff between a borrower’s private information about its future 
credit rating and liquidity risk.  Because lenders cannot benefit from the future control 
rents, banks liquidate too often from the borrower’s optimal standpoint.  A firm’s 
willingness to select short-term debt depends on the private information on its future 
credit ratings.  When it expects its credit ratings to improve sufficiently, it will issue 
short-term debt, and then issue long-term debt after its credit ratings improve.  Therefore, 
in Diamond model optimal maturity structure depends on the tradeoff between a 
preference for short maturity due to expecting their credit ratings to improve and liquidity 
risk.  Diamond predicts that firms with high credit ratings issue short-term debt because 
they are willing to bear the liquidity risk of refinancing short-term debt, and firms with 
somewhat lower ratings prefer long-term debt because they try to avoid high liquidity 
risk.  Firms with lowest credit ratings should borrow short-term because they do not have 
any choice but to borrow short-term.   
Diamond (1993) extends his 1991 paper, and considers the priority of debt in 






information about their credit quality choose the seniority and maturity of their debt.  In 
the paper, borrowers with better private information try to increase the sensitivity of 
financing costs to new information for a given protection of managerial control.  To 
protect large control rents, good borrowers want some short-term debt and bad borrowers 
want all long-term debt.  The maturity and priority structure of debt preferred by good 
borrowers is chosen by all borrowers.  The choice of all long-term debt would reveal that 
a borrower was bad type, and then no loan would be made.  Good borrowers want less 
liquidation than lenders would choose, but they do not want to eliminate liquidation for 
unexpectedly realized low credit ratings.  Therefore, a mix of short- and long-term debt 
will be used to balance borrowers’ and lenders’ desires.  The main result of the paper is 
that borrowers who choose both maturities select senior short-term debt and junior long-
term debt.  The long-term debtholders will allow the issue of additional future debt even 
if it dilutes the value of their long-term debt.  Borrowers who receive very low future 
credit ratings are liquidated, and other borrowers who receive moderately low future 
credit ratings are not liquidated.       
Sharpe (1991) shows that when the firm is unfortunate in the early going, the use 
of short-term debt can lead to inefficient liquidation.  When a firm experiences financial 
difficulty, an increase in its financing costs makes the managers consume more perks.  If 
lenders are not willing to offer concessionary loan rates, short-term debt contracts might 
result in credit rationing and inefficient liquidations.  He shows that under symmetric 







Due to liquidity risk, some firms have an incentive to borrow long-term.  
However, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) show that the interest rate a lender charges may 
affect the riskiness of the pool of loans by either: 1) sorting potential borrowers or 2) 
affecting the actions of borrowers.  In their model, interest rate may serve as a screening 
device.  Because a lender will increase its interest rate only up to the point where its 
return is maximized, there exists credit rationing.  Because less risky borrowers drop out 
of the market as interest rates increase (adverse selection), a lender does not simply 
increase interest rates.  Thus, low quality firms find it difficult to borrow long-term 
because the adverse selection problem is severe in the long-term debt market.  The 
implications in Stigliz and Weiss (1981) are consistent with Guedes and Opler’s (1996) 
empirical evidence that firms with speculative grade bond ratings usually borrow in the 
middle of the maturity spectrum because they are screened out of the long-term debt 
market.  Also, Denis and Mihov (2003) find that credit quality plays an important role in 
the choice of debt.  Firms with the highest credit quality typically issue public debt with 
an average maturity of 15 years, and firms with the medium credit quality borrow from 
banks with an average maturity of three years.  Firms with the lowest credit quality 
borrow from non-bank private lenders with an average maturity of eight years.              
The papers based on agency costs or asymmetric information argue that short-
term debt can reduce agency costs or can be an effective mechanism to signal managers’ 
private information.  However, when a firm issues short-term debt, it bears the risk of 
being forced into inefficient liquidation because refinancing may not be available.  
Therefore, when a firm issues short-term debt, it should trade off between liquidity risk 






simultaneous equation approach, Johnson (2003) finds that short-term debt attenuates the 
negative effect of growth opportunities on leverage.   He also finds that short debt 
maturity increases liquidity risk, and thus negatively affects leverage.  The results 
confirm that when firms choose short-term debt, they balance the positive effect of 
decreasing underinvestment problems against the negative effect of increasing liquidity 
risk. 
2.5 Tax Issues and Debt Maturity 
There is a long history of debate regarding whether taxes are relevant in financing 
decisions.  Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963) show that if corporate interest expense is 
tax deductible, debt financing results in an increase in the total distributable cash flows to 
security holders.  Following their papers, subsequent researchers propose a “tradeoff 
theory” of capital structure that financial managers can optimize capital structure as a 
tradeoff between tax advantages and prospective financial distress costs (see Brennan and 
Schwartz (1978), Kim (1978), and Scott (1976)).  However, Miller (1977) argues that 
debt financing is not relevant because the corporate tax gain from debt is neutralized by a 
commensurate tax disadvantage to debtholders.   
Brennan and Schwartz (1978) use the option pricing framework of Black and 
Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973) to show that short-term debt is optimal with corporate 
taxes.  Their model assumes corporate tax savings, the possibility that at some future date 
the firm may have no taxable income against which the interest payments on the debt 
may be offset, and the existence of an unlevered firm.  They show that it is optimal for a 






decreases with maturity.  Boyce and Kalotay (1979) show that when term structure of 
interest rates rises, long-term debt is optimal. 
Brick and Ravid (1985) extend the models of Brennan and Schwartz (1978) and 
Boyce and Kalotay (1979) by allowing for default, possible agency costs, and a non-flat 
term structure of interest rates.  They show that if the term structure of corporate coupon 
rates is increasing, long-term debt is optimal because the tax benefit of debt is 
accelerated.  If term structure is decreasing, short-term debt is optimal for the same 
reason.   
Brick and Ravid (1991) assume stochastic interest rates.  In addition to the 
acceleration of tax benefits documented by Brick and Ravid (1985), interest rate 
uncertainty makes the long-term debt increase debt capacity.  When interest rate 
uncertainty is present and the term structure is increasing, the acceleration motivation 
works in the same direction as the debt capacity factor.  When the term structure is 
declining, the two factors operate in opposite directions.  The main result of the paper is 
that in the case of increasing or flat term structure or even sometimes a decreasing term 
structure of interest rates, long-term debt is optimal.  If the term premium is sufficiently 
negative, then long-term debt is optimal.    
Kim, Mauer, and Stohs (1995) examine the influence of corporate debt maturity 
policy on investor tax-timing options.  They show that when investors optimally realize 
capital losses and defer capital gains, a long-term debt maturity strategy maximizes 
investor tax-timing option value.  Option pricing theory indicates that the value of a tax-
timing option increases with maturity and also increases with variation in interest rates.  






rate volatility increases.  Second, firms lengthen debt maturity as the term premium 
increases.  Using a data set of 328 industrial firms during the period 1980 to 1989, they 
find a positive relation between debt maturity and interest rate volatility.  Yet, they find a 
negative relation between debt maturity and term spread over the first half of the sample 
period and a positive relation over the second half.  Also, Barclay and Smith (1995), 
Barclay and Smith (1996), and Guedes and Opler (1996) find a negative relation between 
term spread and maturity, which is inconsistent with the argument of tax timing option 
but consistent with market timing. 
2.6 Research Design and Hypothesis Development 
In this dissertation, I try to answer the unsolved problem in Baker et al. (2003) 
and Titman (2002) about whether managers have timing ability in debt markets or 
managers try in vain to time an efficient debt market.  I test whether timing debt markets 
based on public information or inside information increases firm value.   
To test the hypotheses, I classify short-term debt issuers and long-term debt 
issuers into timers and non-timers using several methods.  First, I assume that financial 
managers use term spread to choose the maturity spectrum of debt.  I term this a Naïve 
strategy.  I obtain monthly term spreads over the sample period, 1983-1997.  If firms 
issue long-term debt when the term spread is lower than the median I classify those firms 
are timers, and vice versa.  If firms issue short-term debt when the term spread is lower 
than the median, those firms are non-timers, and vice versa.   
Second, I assume that financial managers use excess bond returns estimated in 
Baker et al. (2003) to choose the debt maturity.  I term this a Complex Strategy.  I use 






excess bond returns.  If firms issue long-term debt when the excess bond returns are 
lower than the median excess bond returns over the sample period, I classify those firms 
as timers, and vice versa.  If firms issue short-term debt when the excess bond returns are 
relatively low, I classify those firms as non-timers, and vice versa.   
Third, I classify timers and non-timers using complex strategy based on one-year-
ahead excess bond returns in combination with an optimal debt maturity function.  Using 
the structural model of debt maturity choice in Guedes and Opler (1996), I use ex-ante 
characteristics of each firm to predict a short-term issue or a long-term issue.  If the firms 
issue debt at a different maturity spectrum from the prediction of debt maturity function 
to follow complex strategy, I classify them as timers.  If firms issue debt at the same 
maturity spectrum as the debt maturity function predicts regardless of complex strategy, I 
classify them as non-timers. 
  Fourth, I assume that financial managers have inside information about the 
change in bond ratings of their firms.  I follow the bond rating changes for three years 
after short-term and long-term debt issues.  If short-term debt issuers experience 
increases in credit quality within three years after the issue, I classify them as timers.  If 
long-term debt issuers experience decreases in credit quality within three years after the 
issue, I also classify them as timers.  
Then, I investigate the effect of timing strategies on firm value.  If the timing 
strategies can reduce the overall cost of capital, the capital markets should reflect the 
strategies in firm value.  First, I test whether the information about timing strategy is 
revealed to the market at the announcement of straight debt issues.  Using event study 






timers are different from that for non-timers.  Also, I test whether the announcement 
effects of straight debt offering are cross-sectionally related to timing strategies after 
controlling for other determinants of the effects.  To complement the event study, I also 
test whether the mean change in q (firm value measure) for timers over three years or 5 
years after debt issuance is higher than that for non-timers.   
Second, if the timing strategies are successful and if investors can separate timers 
and non-timers, then timers should have higher firm value than non-timers.  Thus, using a 
multivariate regression approach I test whether q is related to timing strategies even after 
controlling for other determinants of q. 
In summary, I test the following three main null hypotheses in this research: 
 
0H  : The average share price response to the announcements of long-term 
straight debt issues for timers is equal to that for non-timers. 
 
To complement the above null hypothesis and to test the possibility that any increase in 
firm value shows up after debt issuance, I examine changes in Tobin’s q (from before to 
after debt issue) across timers and non-timers.  By implementing timing strategies, firm 
managers can lock in lower interest rates.  Then, changes in interest rates in the future 
will increase firm value. 
 
0H  : The average change in q for timers is equal to that for non-timers. 
Then, I test whether timers have higher value than non-timers because there is a 







0H  : The average q for timers is equal to that for non-timers. 
If I find that timing strategies increase firm value, the results would suggest that 
managers successfully time inefficient and segmented bond markets.  If the timing 
strategies do not increase the value of the firm, the results would suggest that managers 
try in vain to time an efficient market.  In this way, I try to address the unsolved problem 
in Titman (2002) and Baker et al. (2003) about whether financial managers try to time 
debt markets in vain or financial managers successfully time an inefficient and segmented 
capital markets. 
Also, I investigate investment banks’ timing ability based on market conditions.  
The ability of investment banks to sell debt issues can be more important to debt issuers 
because debt issues are not as actively traded as equity issues.  The debt timing strategy 
of financial managers might come from the advising of investment banks that are 
involved in the debt issuance process.  Thus, I investigate whether reputation of 
investment banks affect the timing strategies. 
The literature ties quality to reputation.  In fact, a firm’s ability to repeatedly 
deliver goods and/or services of high quality is the cornerstone of the reputation building 
process (Klein and Leffler (1981); Shapiro (1983)).  Additionally, numerous studies have 
examined the tradeoff between preserving reputation and the potential gains related to 
providing a low quality product and found that for firms that expect continued operations, 
the benefits do not outweigh the costs.3   Puri (1999) develops a model of the certification 
role of financial intermediary on security issues, and shows that high-reputation 
                                                 






intermediaries have large incentives to maintain their reputation, which leads to high 
certification standards and higher prices of securities that go public.   
The certification role of underwriters is extensively examined empirically in 
security issue process.  A professional service provider’s reputation can impact the 
market value of their client and the client’s stakeholders rely on the service provider to 
mitigate the asymmetric information problem that has been shown to lead to market 
failure.4  Carter and Manaster (1990) and Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998) find a negative 
relation between initial public offering (IPO) underpricing and underwriter reputation.  
More importantly, Carter and Manaster (1990) provide evidence that low dispersion 
issuers signal their low risk characteristics by engaging prestigious underwriters who, in 
order to preserve their high reputation, market only IPOs of low dispersion firms.  
Megginson and Weiss (1990) find that the presence of venture capitalists reduces IPO 
underpricing in a sample of firms in the period 1983-1987.  Similarly, the choice of 
auditor also provides firms with an opportunity to signal their value.5  Thus, the 
investment bank, the venture capitalist, and the auditing firm (i.e. the service providers) 
assume both a certification and a monitoring role.  These papers use tombstone ranks or 
market share to measure the reputation of investment banks. 
Even though previous literature has extensively examined the certification role of 
investment banks in the equity issue process, a limited number of empirical papers 
analyze the underwriters’ role on corporate bond issues.  Logue and Rogalski (1979) 
examine the effect of investment bank reputation on underwriter fees and interest rates.  
They do not find any differential fees or interest rates among prestigious underwriters. 
                                                 
4 See Akerlof (1970). 






Livingston and Miller (2000) show that offering yields and issuance expenses paid by the 
issuer are lower for debt underwritten by the more prestigious investment banking firms.  
They argue that the evidence indicates investment banker reputation acts to certify the 
value of a debt issue to investors.  To investigate the impact of the underwriter’s role on 
the timing strategy, I measure reputation of underwriters using tombstone ranks or market 
share following the literature mentioned in the above.  Then, I test whether the reputation 







































DATA DESCRIPTION AND CLASSIFICATION OF TIMERS 
In this chapter, I explain the process of the data selection and examine 
characteristics of the firms that are included for this research.  I investigate the 
characteristics of short- and long-term debt issuers.  Then, I explain the classification 
methods of timers.  I classify the short- and long-term debt issuers into timers and non-
timers using market interest rates or future bond ratings changes.  Also, I combine the 
predictions of debt maturity function and one-year-ahead-excess bond returns to obtain a 
better classification of timers. 
3.1 Data Description 
The primary data on public debt issues of U.S. firms over the period of 1983-1997 
are obtained from Security Data Corporation (SDC) New Issues Database.6  After I 
remove unit issues with other securities and issues by foreign companies, I obtain 
offering date, filing date, proceeds, maturity, coupon rate, offered yield to maturity 
(YTM), spread to treasury bills, main SIC code of the firm issuing the debts and the name 
of lead underwriter from the SDC database.  I use the following criteria to select the debt 
issues that are included in the sample: 
i) The issuing company is an industrial firm or utility firm.  To satisfy this 
criterion, I omit debt securities issued by firms with SIC codes of 6000-
6999.  This criterion excludes more than half of all the issues in the 
population. 
                                                 







ii) The debt security is a straight note, bond, or debenture, which means I 
omit convertible instruments, certificates, Liquid Yield Option Notes 
(LYONs)7, and extendable or retractable notes . 
iii) The debt security should not be backed by mortgages, which means  I 
omit mortgage bonds and lease obligation bonds. 
iv) The debt security should have fixed-rate coupon payments.  To test the 
debt market-timing hypothesis, I remove the debt securities with float-
rate coupon payments. 
v) I remove the debt securities with time to maturity of more than 30 years 
because those debt securities have equity-like characteristics.           
After satisfying criteria (i)-(v), 5,105 debt issues remain.  Out of 5,105 debt 
issues, 264 issues have term to maturity of less than three years.  Most of those short-term 
debt issues are medium-term notes (MTNs).8  Medium term notes are registered with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission under the shelf registration rule (Rule 415), which 
gives a firm the right to issue securities on a continuous basis.  Finally, I have 4,841 long-
term debt issues, which mainly consist of bonds, notes, and debentures. 
 I first investigate the characteristics of long-term debt issues with terms to 
maturity of more than three years.  Panel A of Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics 
on the 4,841 long-term debt issues over the period, 1983-1997, year by year.  The number 
of long-term debt issues increases over time.  Specifically, firms have issued more long-
term debt in the middle of the 1980s (1985-1987) and early in the 1990s (1991-1993).   
                                                 
7 Consistent with Guedes and Opler (1996), I find that LYONs were issued infrequently. 
8 Traditionally, the term, “medium term note”, was used to describe debt issues with maturity greater than 
one year but less than 15 years.  Yet, this is not a true characteristic anymore.  The maturities of medium 
term notes are sometimes less than one year or more than 30 years.  For instance, Walt Disney Corporation 






Table 1. Characteristics of Long-term Debt Issues  
Panel A reports the number of long-term debt issues, average term to maturity (in days), total proceeds, 
average proceeds, average coupon rate, YTM (offered yield to maturity), spread to long-term government 
bonds (basis point), and C-M (Carter-Manaster’s ) underwriter ranks year by year.  Panel B reports the 
number of long-term debt issues, and mean, median, minimum, maximum, and standard deviation of each 
variable.  Panel C reports the number of long-term debt issues, and mean and median of each variable for 
the sub-samples based on bond ratings.  Panel D reports the number of long-term debt issues, and mean 
and median of each variable for the sub-samples based on call provision. 
 
Panel A. Characteristics of long-term debt issues year by year 


























er ranks  
1983 136 6145 12.2 89.4 11.8 12.4 176.3 7.97 
1984 131 4961 12.6 96.0 13.2 13.8 173.1 8.13 
1985 266 5381 27.1 101.9 12.2 12.3 194.8 8.59 
1986 438 5215 56.6 129.3 10.0 10.1 257.1 8.67 
1987 280 4963 36.1 128.8 10.7 10.7 253.2 8.71 
1988 227 4580 31.6 139.0 10.9 10.9 212.9 8.73 
1989 170 4957 25.5 150.2 10.8 10.8 248.6 8.79 
1990 137 4269 18.1 132.0 9.7 9.8 126.2 9.00 
1991 405 4515 40.5 100.0 8.9 9.0 128.9 8.92 
1992 487 4527 57.1 117.2 8.5 8.5 168.0 8.85 
1993 561 4914 61.5 109.6 7.8 7.8 191.8 8.81 
1994 278 4066 26.4 94.9 8.5 8.6 184.1 8.83 
1995 441 4674 40.4 91.5 7.5 7.6 114.1 8.77 
1996 352 4167 32.7 92.8 7.5 7.7 130.5 8.85 
1997 532 4532 38.3 72.0 7.1 7.2 91.2 8.90 
Full 
sample 
4841 4734 758.6 106.70 9.0 9.2 175.6 8.77 










Panel B. Characteristics of long-term debt issues for total sample 
Variable N Mean Median Minimum Maximum Standard 
deviation 
Term to maturity (days) 
 
4831 4734 3657 1094 10950 3063 
Proceeds (in $ Millions) 
 
4841 106.7 86.5 0.62 1137.4 101.2 
Coupon rate 
(%) 





9.2 8.8 3.6 18.5 2.4 
Spread to Treasury (basis 
point) 
4131 175.6 100 3.0 1060 163.9 
C-M underwriter ranks 
 
4823 8.77 9.10 1.1 9.1 0.64 
 
 
Panel C.  Characteristics of long-term debt issues by bond ratings 
Investment grade bonds Speculative grade bonds 
 







Term to maturity 
(days) 
3524 5021 3657 1207 3893 3655 100 4771 3756 
Proceeds (in $ 
Millions) 
3530 102.8 86.5 1210 124.1 90.3 101 32.6 18.1 
Coupon rate 
(%) 
3530 8.1 7.8 1210 11.5 11.5 101 11.7 12.0 
YTM (%) 
 
3109 8.3 8.0 1100 11.6 11.6 74 12.7 12.0 
Spread To Treasury 
(basis point) 
2982 91.4 80 1088 400 402 61 282 307 
C-M underwriter 
ranks 
3520 8.89 9.1 1206 8.5 8.9 97 7.2 8.0 
 
 
Panel D. Characteristics of long-term debt issues with call vs. w/o call provision 
Debt issues without call 
 
Debt issues with call  
Variable 
N Mean Median 
 
N Mean Median 
Term to maturity (days) 
 
2776 4088 3651 2055 5607 3663 
Proceeds 
(in $ Millions) 
2778 97.1 72.4 2063 119.7 90.9 
Coupon rate (%) 
 
2778 7.84 7.50 2063 10.7 10.5 
YTM (%) 
 
2352 7.94 7.65 1931 10.7 10.5 
Spread to Treasury (basis 
point) 
 
2237 99.1 77.0 1894 266.0 220.0 
C-M underwriter ranks 
 







The terms to maturity for long-term debt issues decrease over the time period. The 
average term to maturity is 6,145 days (16.8 years) in 1983, and it decreases to 4,532 
days (12.4 years) in 1997.  Total proceeds and mean proceeds from debt issues are 
expressed in 1983 constant dollars.  The pattern of total proceeds shows that firms sought 
more financing from the debt market in the middle of 1980s and early in the 1990s.  
Mean proceeds are less than 1 million dollars in 1983 and 1984, and they are more than 1 
million dollars during 1985-1993.  Then, mean proceeds fall to less than 1 million dollars 
during 1994-1997.  The reduction of mean proceeds during 1994-1997 might be related 
to the boom in the stock market in those periods.  Firms tend to issue long-term debt at 
coupon rates slightly lower than, or close to market interest rates, which means that firms 
usually issue long-term debt at par value.  The spread to Treasury bonds tends to fluctuate 
over time.  The spreads are more than 200 basis points and highest during 1986-1989, 
and the spreads has fallen since 1990.   
  Following Livingston and Miller (2000), I use Carter-Manaster’s (1990) 
tombstone ranks as the reputation measures which are available on Jay Ritter’s website, 
or market share of each investment bank in debt market.  The last column of Panel A 
shows the mean C-M underwriter ranks (Carter-Manaster’s tombstone ranks) each year.  
The mean tombstone ranks increase over the time in the 1980s and peak at 9.0 in 1990.   
Tombstone ranks have fallen since 1991. 
Panel B shows the number of long-term debt issues, and the mean, median, 
minimum, maximum, and standard deviation of term to maturity, proceeds, coupon rate, 
YTM, spread to Treasury, C-M underwriter’s ranks for the whole long-term debt issues.  






that the term to maturity is skewed to the right.  The minimum term to maturity is three 
years and the maximum is 30 years.  The mean proceeds are 106.7 million dollars and the 
proceeds are also skewed to the right.  The mean coupon rate is nine percent and the 
mean yield to maturity is 9.2 percent.  The mean spread to Treasury is 175.6 basis points 
and the median is 100 basis points, which indicates that the spread is also skewed to the 
right.  The mean tombstone ranks are 8.77, and the maximum and minimum ranks are 9.1 
and 1.1, respectively.        
Panel C shows the characteristics of long-term debt issues based on Moody’s and 
Standard & Poor’s bond ratings.  Of the 4, 841 new long-term debt issues over the period 
of 1983-1997, 3,530 issues (72.9 percent) have investment-grade bond ratings at the time 
of issue, 1,210 issues (25.0 percent) have speculative-grade bond ratings, and 101 issues 
(2.1 percent) are not rated.  The mean term to maturity of investment grade bonds is 
5,021 days (the median is 3,657 days), and the mean term to maturity of speculative 
grade bonds is 3,893 days (the median is 3,655 days).  Interestingly, the mean and 
median proceeds ($124.1 million and $90.3 million) of speculative grade bonds are 
higher than those ($102.8 million and $86.5 million) of investment grade bonds.  Non-
rated debt issues have much smaller proceeds with mean and median of $32.6 millions 
and $18.1 millions.  As expected, the coupon rate, yield to maturity, and spread to 
Treasury of investment grade bonds are much lower than those of speculative grade 
bonds and non-rated bonds.  Also, investment grade debt issues tend to be underwritten 
by more prestigious investment banks.   
The call provision of debt issues could be related to debt market timing.  Panel D 






issues, 2,063 issues (42.6 percent) have call provisions.9  Debt issues with call provisions 
tend to be large compared to debt issues without call provisions, and also have higher 
coupon rates, yields to maturity, and spreads to treasury as expected due to the call 
provisions.  Carter-Manaster’s ranks show that firms tend to employ more prestigious 
investment banks when they issue debt securities without calls. 
Using the proceeds of each debt issue, I calculate the debt market share of each 
underwriter based on my sample of straight debt issues over the period, 1983-1997.  
Table 2 reports the market share for the top seventeen underwriters.  The top seventeen 
underwriters account for 97 percent of the market based on proceeds.   The top 
underwriter in the debt market, Goldman Sachs, accounts for 16.6 percent of debt issues, 
and Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Saloman Brothers, First Boston, Lehman Brothers, 
Drexel, et al., Donaldson et al., J.P. Morgan, and Kidder Peabody are among the other top 
ten underwriters.10  Interestingly, Drexel et al. and Donaldson et al. have underwritten 
mainly speculative grade bonds while the other top ten underwriters have underwritten 
mainly investment grade bonds.  Drexel et al. has underwritten 20 investment grade debt 
issues, but has underwritten 245 speculative grade debt issues.  Also, Donaldson et al. 
have underwritten 45 investment grade issues, but have underwritten 95 speculative grade 
issues.  
To match the long-term debt issues with accounting data from Research Insight, I 
aggregate the debt issues by the same firm each year and match the issuers with the firms 
in the database.  In this way, I obtain 2,289 long-term debt issuers over the sample period,   
                                                 
9 This result is inconsistent with Robbins and Schatzberg’s (1986) argument that non-callable long term 
debt is a dominated security.  Out of 4,841 straight long-term debt issues over the sample period 1983-1997 
in this research, about 57 percent of the debt issues does not have a call provision. 
10 In the paper of Livingston and Miller (2000), Bear Stearns and Dillon Reed are ranked as top ten 






Table 2. Market Share for Top Seventeen Underwriters 
This table reports the seventeen investment bankers with the largest market share of total gross proceeds (in 
$ Billions, 1983 constant dollar), and the number of issues (in parentheses) underwritten for industrial debt 















72.0 (695) 13.4 (97) 85.8 (793) 16.6 
Merrill Lynch 
 
48.6 (486) 19.1 (135) 67.9 (629) 13.1 
Morgan Stanley 
 
50.9 (409) 14.7 (97) 65.7 (507) 12.7 
Saloman Brothers 
 
50.4 (420) 11.2 (81) 61.7 (502) 11.9 
First Boston 
 
45.9 (367) 12.5 (86) 58.4 (454) 11.3 
Lehman Brothers 
 
35.2 (323) 8.5 (71) 43.7 (395) 8.5 
Drexel, et al. 
 
1.2 (20) 33.9 (245) 40.1 (282) 7.8 
Donaldson, et al. 
 
3.7 (45) 12.0 (95) 15.8 (142) 3.1 
J.P. Morgan 
 
12.1 (158) 1.3 (15) 13.4 (174) 2.6 
Kidder Peabody 
 
7.5 (112) 2.3 (31) 9.8 (143) 1.9 
Dillon Reed 
 
7.7 (59) 1.7 (24) 9.4 (83) 1.8 
Smith Barney 
 
5.2 (62) 2.1 (26) 7.3 (92) 1.4 
Bear Stearns 
 
2.4 (33) 4.2 (45) 7.0 (83) 1.4 
PaineWebber 
 
3.7 (29) 1.3 (18) 5.0 (48) 1.0 
BT Securities 
 
0.2 (1) 2.6 (24) 2.8 (25) 0.5 
Citicorp Securities 
Markets 
1.5 (112) 1.2 (17) 2.8 (129) 0.5 
Prudential Securities 
 
0.3 (5) 1.8 (24) 2.7 (43) 0.5 
Top 17 Total 
 
352.7 (3336) 143.9 (1131) 499.4 (4524) 96.69 
Total Market 
 
363.0 (3530) 150.2 (1210) 516.5 (4841) 100 
   






1983-1997.  I collect accounting data from Research Insight and insider ownership data 
from Compact Disclosure and Value Line Investment Survey for each issuer.11 
Panel A of Table 3 reports characteristics of long-term debt issuers year by year.  
Following Chung and Pruitt (1994), C-P q is measured as market value of equity plus 
liquidation value of preferred stock plus book value of debt divided by book value of 
assets.  The average C-P q of long-term debt issuers tends to be higher in the 1990s 
compared to the 1980s.  The average total assets of long-term debt issuers are larger in 
1990 and 1991.  The long-term leverage ratio, long-term debt plus current portion of 
long-term debt divided by book value of assets, is relatively higher in the late 1980s and 
in the early 1990s.  Dividend payout ratio, measured as the three-year average of cash 
dividends declared on the common stock divided by income before extraordinary items 
and discontinued operations less preferred dividend requirements, fluctuates over the 
period.12  The dividend payout ratio is higher during the period of 1989-1992 and in 
1995.  The ratio of market value to book value of equity also fluctuates over the period, 
and is relatively higher in the 1990s.13  The ratio of research & development expenditure 
to sales is very stable over the period, and increases to three percent from two percent in 
1996 and 1997.  Finally, inside ownership, which is the ratio of shares owned by 
executives and directors to the number of shares of common stock outstanding, is 
relatively lower in the 1990s. 
   
                                                 
11 I mainly use Compact Disclosure to collect inside ownership data.  Yet, I use Value Line Investment 
Survey to collect the data for the issuers during 1983-1988 since Compact Disclosure is available after 
1988.  
12 I remove those observations with negative dividend payout ratio and with the ratio of higher than 500 
percent because these outliers might change the regression results.  
13 Also, I remove those observation with negative market to book ratio of equity and with the ratio of higher 






Table 3.  Characteristics of Long-term Debt Issuers  
Panel A reports the characteristics of long-term debt issuers year by year.  The panel presents means of 
each variable used in this research.  C-P q is the market value of equity plus liquidation value of preferred 
stock plus book value of debt divided by book value of total assets.  Long-term leverage ratio is long-term 
debt divided by total assets.  Dividend payout ratio indicates three-year average of cash dividends paid to 
common stock holders divided by earnings before extraordinary and discontinued operation items.  Market 
to book ratio of equity is the ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity.  R&D to sales ratio is 
research & development expenditure divided by net sales.  Insider ownership is the ratio of shares owned 
by executives and directors to the number of shares of common stock outstanding.  Panel B reports the 
number of firms, and the mean, median, minimum, maximum, and standard deviation of each variable for 
the full sample.   
 
Panel A.  Characteristics of long-term debt issuers year by year 

















1983 .85 3,317.0 .42 .39 2.06 .02 14.33 
1984 .83 3,358.4 .42 .24 1.80 .02 17.87 
1985 .89 3,838.2 .42 .31 2.17 .02 10.98 
1986 1.14 4,245.6 .44 .40 2.05 .02 10.35 
1987 1.01 3,863.6 .47 .35 2.25 .02 6.14 
1988 1.01 4,817.5 .51 .45 1.82 .02 14.95 
1989 1.14 8,597.5 .53 .49 2.10 .02 7.18 
1990 1.03 13,278.5 .42 .48 1.70 .02 7.46 
1991 1.29 10,769.8 .43 .46 2.48 .02 7.80 
1992 1.30 8,704.8 .50 .50 2.65 .03 10.75 
1993 1.27 6,497.5 .53 .41 3.56 .02 9.62 
1994 1.17 6,192.1 .53 .44 3.22 .02 10.92 
1995 1.30 9,176.7 .46 .51 2.99 .02 9.06 
1996 1.37 9,794.6 .46 .41 3.43 .03 10.42 
1997 1.62 6,770.6 .47 .32 4.97 .03 6.92 
Total 1.21 7,037.7 .47 .42 2.83 .02 9.75 







Panel B.  Characteristics of long-term debt issuers for full sample 
Variable N Mean Median Minimum Maximum Standard 
deviation 
C-P q 1,658 1.21 1.06 .01 17.72 .77 
Total assets 
($ in millions) 
2,095 7,037.7 2,499.5 .26 262,867.0 18,000.7 
Long-term 
leverage ratio 
1,908 .47 .45 0 .98 .22 
Dividend payout 
ratio 
1,598 .42 .30 0 479.5 57.12 
Market to book 
ratio of equity 
1,598 2.83 1.97 0.01 62.24 3.89 
R&D to sales ratio 1,006 .02 .01 0 .26 .03 
Inside ownership 
(%) 




Panel B of Table 3 reports the number of long-term debt issuers and the mean, 
median, minimum, maximum, and standard deviation of each variable for the full sample.  
C-P q has a mean of 1.21 and a median of 1.06, which implies that the q is skewed to the 
right.  The mean of total assets is about $7 billion, but the median is about $2.5 billion, 
which means that the size of the issuers is also skewed to the right.  The mean and 
median of three-year average dividend payout ratio and market to book ratio of equity are 
42 percent and 30 percent, and 2.83 and 1.97, respectively.  The mean and median of 
research & development expenditure to sales ratio are two percent and one percent, 
respectively.  Inside ownership is skewed to the right with a mean of 9.75 percent and a 






Financial managers may have to switch between long-term debt and short-term 
debt to implement timing strategies.  Therefore, I need to have a sample of short-term 
issuers.  Following Baker et al. (2003), I use notes payable from Research Insight, which 
includes bank debt, commercial paper, and other private short-term debt, to construct the 
sub-sample of short-term debt issuers.14  Graham and Harvey (2001) find that large-cap 
and dividend-paying firms are more likely to time debt markets.  I restrict the sub-sample 
to dividend-paying industrial firms since I remove financial firms for the sub-sample of 
long-term debt issuers.  Then, I compare the level of notes payable from the previous 
year and assume as short-term debt issuers the firms that increase notes payable more 
than 5 percent from the previous year in a given year.  In this way, I obtain 3,198 short-
term debt issuers over the sample period, 1983-1997.  The final sample of this research 
consists of 2,289 long-term debt issuers and 3,198 short-term debt issuers. 
Table 4 reports the comparison of characteristics across short- and long-term debt 
issuers.  Long-term debt issuers are slightly higher q than short-term debt issuers with a 
mean of 1.21 versus 1.16 and with a median of 1.05 versus 1.00.  The mean difference 
test shows no statistically significant difference, but the non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis 
test shows that the median of q for long-term debt issuers is significantly larger than that 
for short-term debt issuers.  Long-term debt issuers also have significantly higher total 
assets and higher long-term leverage ratios.  Interestingly, short-term debt issuers 
maintain significantly higher dividend payout ratios, compared to long-term debt issuers.  
Long-term debt issuers have higher market to book ratios of equity, but lower ratios of 
                                                 
14 The item of notes payable from Research Insight includes bank acceptances, bank overdrafts, loans 
payable to officers of the company, loans payable to parents, and consolidated and unconsolidated 
subsidiaries, loans payable to stockholders, notes payable to banks and others, brokerage houses’ drafts 







Table 4. Comparison of Short- vs. Long-term Debt Issuers  
The table reports the number of short- and long-term debt issuers, mean and median of each variable, and 
mean and median difference test results (t-test and non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test) across two sub-
samples. C-P q is market value of equity plus liquidation value of preferred stock plus book value of debt 
divided by book value of total assets. Total assets are presented in million dollars.  Long-term leverage 
ratio is long-term debt divided by total assets.  Dividend payout ratio indicates three-year average of cash 
dividends paid to common stock holders divided by earnings before extraordinary and discontinued items. 
Market to book ratio of equity is the ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity.  R&D to sales 
ratio is research & development expenditure divided by net sales.  Insider ownership is the ratio of shares 
owned by executives and directors to the number of shares of common stock outstanding. 
 
Variable Short- or 
Long-term 
debt issuers 
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Short-term 2,889 
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2.34 1.77 Market to 
book ratio of 
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** and *** Indicates significant difference at 5 percent and 1 percent level, respectively. 
 
 
research & development expenditure to sales.   Finally, short-term debt issuers have 






large, more leveraged, more diffused, and lower dividend paying firms.  Also, they have 
higher q and higher market to book ratios of equity.                       
I obtain monthly Treasury bill and Treasury bond yields, interest rates on 
commercial paper and corporate bonds, consumer price index, the yearly returns of long-
term government bonds and short-term government bills, and the yearly returns of long-
term corporate bonds and commercial paper from Stocks, bonds, bills, and inflation: 2001 
Yearbook of Ibbotson Associates.  Also, aggregate debt issues data are obtained from the 
Federal Reserve Flow of Funds database.   The data are taken from the credit market 
liabilities of the nonfarm nonfinancial corporate business sector in Flow of Funds 
database.15 
3.2 Four Classification Methods of Timers 
3.2.1 Naïve Timing Strategy 
Guedes and Opler (1996), Barclay and Smith (1995), and Stohs and Mauer (1995) 
show that debt maturity is inversely related to term spread.  Also, Graham and Harvey 
(2001) survey evidence indicates that financial managers tend to choose debt maturity 
based on term spread.  From these empirical results, I can assume that firms tend to issue 
short-term debt when the term structure is steeper and issue long-term debt when the term 
structure is flatter.  I call this financing policy the naïve timing strategy.  Figure 1 shows 
the monthly term spread trend over the period of 1983-1997.  The term spread is the 
interest rate on 30-year Treasury bonds minus the interest rate on 3-month Treasury bills.  
The government bill and bond series come from the Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP).  The term spread fluctuates over the period 1983-1985, and then shows a  
 
                                                 










































































Figure 1. Monthly Term Spreads during 1983-1997 
 
 
mean reverting pattern since the middle of 1980s.  The term spread decreased to almost 
zero percent in the late 1980s, peaked at about 4.5 percent in 1993, and has declined since 
1993. 
The monthly median term-spread over the period is 2.40 percent.  I assume that if 
firms issue long-term debt in the year when the term spread is lower than the median, 
they are market-timers.  If firms issue long-term debt in the year when the term spread is 
higher than the median, they are apparently non-market timers.  Therefore, timers issue 






Also, timers issue short-term debt and non-timers issue long-term debt in 1983-1985, 
1987, and 1992-1994. 
3.2.2 Complex Timing Strategy 
Baker et al. (2003) show that predicted excess bond returns are related to 
inflation, the real short-term rate, and the term spread.  Following Baker et al. (2003), I 
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where π is the actual inflation rate (the annual percentage change in the consumer price 
index)16, the real short-term rate( π−GSy ) is the Treasury bill return minus actual 
inflation, the term spread( GSGL yy − ) is the difference between the Treasury bond yield 
and the Treasury bill return, the credit spread ( GSCS yy − ) is the difference between 
commercial paper yield and Treasury bill return, and the credit term 
spread ))()(( GSCSGLCL yyyy −−− uses the corporate bond yield and the other yields just 
introduced.  
To forecast excess bond returns, I use the same market interest rate data that 
Baker et al. (2003) use in their paper.   I obtain yearly Treasury bill and Treasury bond 
yields, commercial paper yield, and long-term corporate bond yield over the sample 
period 1944-2000, from Ibbotson Associates.  The Stocks, bonds, bills, and inflation: 
2001 Yearbook from Ibbotson uses data from the Wall Street Journal to calculate 
                                                 
16 Baker et al. (2003) also use expected inflation rate when they estimate the excess bond return equation.  






December Treasury bill returns for 1977-2000, and CRSP U.S. Government Bond File 
until 1976.  The government bond return series uses the same data as the government bill 
return series, and the return series has a term of approximately 20 years and use a 
reasonably current coupon rate.  Also, the government bond series does not reflect 
potential tax benefits, impaired negotiability, or special redemption or call privileges.  
The corporate bond returns series uses the Salomon Brothers Long-Term High-Grade 
Corporate Bond Index, which includes most Aaa- and Aa- rated bonds, for 1996-2000, a 
backdated Salomon Brothers return series for 1946-1968, and a return index derived from 
the Standard & Poor’s High-Grade Corporate Composite yield index for 1926-1945 
assuming a four percent yield and a 20 year maturity.  Commercial paper return series 
and yield series are obtained from the Federal Reserve Flow of Funds database.        
Table 5 shows the regression results of the above equation using yearly data over 
the period 1944-2000.17  The results on one-year-ahead excess government bond returns 
and three-year ahead excess government bond returns are shown in Panel A.  One-year-
ahead excess government bond returns are significantly positively related to inflation, the 
real short-term rate and the term spread.  The coefficients on credit spread and credit term 
spread are not significant.  Three-year-ahead excess government bond returns are 
significantly positively related to inflation and real short-term rate, but are not 
significantly related to term spread, credit spread, and credit term spread.  Panel B shows 
the regression results on one-year-ahead excess corporate bond returns and three-year-
ahead excess corporate bond returns.  The results for corporate bond returns are similar to  
the results for government bond returns.  The one-year-ahead excess corporate bond  
                                                 
17 Baker et al. (2003) use the data over 1954-2000, and they mention in the paper that if the data over 1944-






Table 5.  Debt Market Conditions and Excess Bond Returns, 1944-2000 
The table reports regression results predicting excess bond returns using inflation (π), the real short-term 
rate ( π−GSy ), the term spread ( GSGL yy − ), the credit spread ( GSCS yy − ), and the credit term spread 
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Panel A estimates excess government bond returns ( GSGL rr − ) and Panel B estimates excess corporate 
bond returns ( CSCL rr − ). 
 



































N 56 54 
2R  .24 .06 






















































N 56 54 
2R  .31 .07 
The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics that are calculated based on standard errors correct for 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. 
* Indicates statistical significance at .10 level. 
** Indicates statistical significance at .05 level. 




returns are positively related to inflation, real short-term rate, and term spread.  Also, the 
three-year-ahead excess corporate bond returns are positively related to real short-term 
rate. 
Because Baker et al. (2003) show that excess bond returns are correlated to the 
long-term share in debt issues, I assume that financial managers use the predicted excess 
bond returns to time the bond market.  Also, I assume that financial managers use current 


















1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998
Ye a r
























Excess government bond returns Excess corporate bond returns
 
                                                                                                                               (figure 2 continued) 
 



















1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998
Y ear





government bond returns and excess corporate bond returns over the period 1983-1997.  
The two return series are almost identical and quite unstable.  First, I assume that when 
the actual excess bond returns are negative as in 1983, 1987, 1989, 1994 and 1996, those 
firms that issue long-term debt are timers, and vice versa.  When actual excess bond 
returns are positive, those firms that issue long-term debt are classified as non-timers, and 
vice versa.   
Second, I use the fitted value of excess bond return equations to classify timers 
and non-timers.  Because the predicted returns for government bonds and corporate 
bonds have similar patterns in Panel B and C, I only use the results for corporate bond 
returns.  For one-year-ahead predicted excess bond returns in Panel B, the median is 3.04 






when the predicted excess bond return is less than the median (3.04 percent), and vice 
versa.  Therefore, timers issue long-term debt and non-timers issue short-term debt during 
1987-1989 and 1994-1997.  Timers issue short-term debt and non-timers issue long-term 
debt during 1983-1986 and 1990-1993.  Also, I use three-year-ahead predicted excess 
bond returns in Panel C in the same way.  The median predicted return is 1.46 percent.       
3.2.3 Debt Maturity Function 
Guedes and Opler (1996), Barclay and Smith (1995), and Stohs and Mauer (1995) 
show that debt maturity is determined by firm size, asset maturity, growth opportunities, 
bond rating, term spread, and tax timing option.  If financial managers in fact follow a 
timing strategy, they can choose the debt maturity that is not indicated by the debt 
maturity function.  I combine a complex strategy and a debt maturity function to obtain a 
better classification of timers.   I estimate the debt maturity function using the variables in 
Guedes and Opler (1996), and then obtain predicted values for debt maturity.  I assume 
that if a firm issues long-term debt following complex timing strategy when the predicted 
value indicates short-term debt issue, it is a timer.  As shown in the table below, timers 
issue debt following a complex timing strategy against the maturity predicted by the debt 
maturity function. 
 


























I modify the debt maturity function used in Guedes and Opler (1996) where they 
use actual maturity of new debt issues, and I dichotomize the new debt issues into short-
term and long-term debt issues.  Long-term debt issues are obtained from SDC as seen in 
Table 3.  Because only a limited number of short-term debt issues with a maturity of less 
than three years are covered in SDC, I use notes payable (Item 206) from Research 
Insight to identify short-term debt issuers following Baker et al. (2003).  If a firm 
increases notes payable more than five percent from previous year, it is assumed to have 
issued short-term debt in a given year.  As mentioned above, I have 3,198 short-term debt 
issues and 2,289 long-term debt issues in the final sample. 
I estimate a probit model to obtain predicted values of long-term or short-term 
debt issues using the accounting data at the end of the previous year of each debt issue.  
Long-term debt takes a value of one, and short-term debt takes a value of zero.  
Independent variables include the following variables: 
Natural log of asset maturity that is measured as gross property, plant, and 
equipment (PPE)/depreciation 
  
    
Dummy variable for investment grade bond rating 
 
Firm size that is measured as natural log of net sales 
 
 
Growth opportunity measures, which are market to book ratio of assets and 
research & development expense divided by net sales 
 
 
Business risk measure (Industry standard deviation of ROA growth) that is 
industry earnings variability measured as the standard deviation of growth in 
earnings before taxes and depreciation divided by assets over previous 5 years by 







Marginal tax rate measures, which are net operating loss carryforwards divided 
by sales and income tax paid divided by assets 
 
 
Term spread that is long-term government bond yield minus short-term 
government bill yield in the middle of the year 
 
Taxes/assets * term premium if the term premium is bigger than the medium 
(2.4%) 
 
Interest rate volatility, which is the standard deviation of monthly 20-year 
Treasury bond returns over the year 
 
Taxes/assets * interest rate volatility if the interest rate volatility is bigger than 
the medium (2.7 percent) 
 
 In Table 5, I report the results of the probit model estimation for the debt maturity 
function.  The partial derivative (marginal effect) of y with respect to each independent 
variable and the corresponding z-statistics are reported.18   The marginal effects are 
computed at the means of each independent variable.  Model 1 includes every variable 
used in Guedes and Opler (1996).19  Firms with more long-term assets have lower 
liquidity risk and lower agency costs of debt, and thus can better support long-term debt.    
However, the marginal effect of asset maturity on the probability to choose long-term 
debt is not significant.  Firms with investment grade bond ratings have higher probability 
                                                 
18 Unlike OLS, the partial derivative (marginal effect) in probit model is not determined by only parameter 
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.   The sign of the marginal effect is determined by kβ , 
since the probability density function (PDF) of normal distribution (φ ) is always positive.  The magnitude 
of the change depends on the magnitude of kβ  and the value of ΒX .  That is, the magnitude of marginal 
effect depends on the values of the other variables and their coefficients because PDF is computed at ΒX .     
19 Guedes and Opler (1996) also use stock return before the issue and stock return after the issue as 
explanatory variables.  Yet, when the stock is overvalued, the firm tends to issue equity, not debt.  






Table 6.  Debt Maturity Function 
Probit model is used to estimate debt maturity function over the sample period 1983-1997.  Long-term debt 
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** Indicates statistical significance at .05 level. 








of choosing long-term borrowings, which is consistent with a liquidity risk explanation.  
Firm size, measured as log of net sales, can measure liquidity risk or agency costs of 
debt.  The result indicates that large firms have a higher probability of choosing short-
term maturity, which is consistent with Guedes and Opler (1996) but inconsistent with 
Barclay and Smith (1995).  The marginal effect of firm size is consistent with the 
liquidity risk explanation, but is not consistent with the agency cost explanation.  The 
marginal effects of market-to-book ratio of assets and research & development-to-sales 
ratio are significantly negative, which is consistent with the prediction of Myers (1977) 
agency theory.  The effect of business risk, measured as industry standard deviation of 
return on assets (ROA) growth, is insignificantly negative, which is inconsistent with the 
liquidity risk explanation because firms in high-risk industry should choose long-term 
debt when interest rates are volatile.  The marginal effect of marginal tax rates of issuers, 
measured as the ratio of net operating loss carryforwards to sales and the ratio of income 
taxes paid to assets, have opposite signs to the expectations of tax explanations, but are 
not significant.  The marginal effect of term spread on the possibility of long-term debt 
issues support Brick and Ravid (1985) and Kim et al. (1995) indicating that borrowers 
prefer long-term debt when the term structure of interest rates is upward sloping.  The 
marginal effect of interest volatility is significantly negative, which is inconsistent with 
Brick and Rivid (1991) and Kim et al. (1995) because interest rate uncertainty makes 
long-term debt increase debt capacity in their model.  The marginal effects of interaction 
terms between term spread and tax rate and between term spread and interest volatility 






 To predict the value of the debt maturity function for more observations, I omit 
R&D/sales and marginal tax rate measures in Model 2 because the data on research & 
development expenses, income tax paid, and net operating loss carryforwards are missing 
for so many observations in Research Insight.  The marginal effects of each variable used 
in Model 2 are not much different from those in Model 1.  After I calculate the predicted 
value of long- or short-term debt from the estimation, I combine the results with the 
complex strategy based on one-year-ahead excess bond returns.  In this way, I find that 
880 firms are timers.               
 3.2.4 Timing Strategy Based on Bond Rating Changes 
 Bond ratings are designed to measure default risk of publicly traded securities.  
The major bond rating agencies are Standard and Poor’s Corporation, Moody’s Investors 
Service, and Fitch Investors Service.  Rating agencies argue that they have access to 
private information when they review ratings.  Also, the review process includes analysis 
of public information and private information provided by management, and discussions 
with management, who is notified of ratings prior to publication.  Managers can then 
appeal the proposed ratings with the presentation of new or additional data.  Through this 
process, managers can be assumed to have information about upcoming bond ratings 
prior to their publication. 
 Whether bond ratings contain pricing-relevant information is well studied.  
Pinches and Singleton (1978) document that when bond ratings increase (decrease), 
abnormally high (low) common stock returns occur before the announcement of the bond 
rating change.  They also show that normal returns occur after bond rating change.  From 






operating conditions of firms after investors had already discounted these changes.  
However, Holthausen and Leftwich (1986) find different results.  They divide their 
sample based on rating upgrades or downgrades and find that announcements of 
downgrades are associated with significantly negative stock returns, but announcements 
of upgrades are associated with insignificant abnormal returns.  Their results suggest that 
rating changes provide information to the capital market.  Dichev and Piotroski (2001) 
analyze the long-run stock returns following bond ratings changes.  They find that 
following bond ratings downgrades, firms experience negative abnormal returns on the 
magnitude of 10 to 14 percent in the following year, but they find insignificant abnormal 
returns for stocks with upgrades.  Also, they document that bond rating changes predict 
subsequent earnings changes that are not fully anticipated by the market.   
 Following Flannery’s (1986) theoretical model, I assume that financial managers 
have inside information about the future changes of their bond ratings and use that 
information to choose maturity when they issue debt securities.  Financial managers 
discuss the possible changes with rating agencies in the review process, but have 
incentive not to divulge negative private information.  Also, the rating changes are related 
to financial and operating information of the issuers prior to and following rating 
changes.  Therefore, financial managers can be assumed to have better information than 
outsiders about their future ratings changes. 
 I follow Standard and Poor’s bond rating changes during three years after short- 
and long-term debt issues.  The data on bond rating changes are obtained from Research 
Insight during the period 1986-1997 and Standard and Poor’s Bond Records during 1983-






grades (for example, from BB+ to BB-), it is assumed to be a timer.  If the firm borrows 
short term expecting upgrades, it is also assumed to be a timer.  Of the 3,686 firms with 
bond ratings in the sample, 956 firms (25.94 percent) experience downgrades and 610 
firms (16.55 percent) experience upgrades within three years after short- or long-term 
debt issues.       
 In this chapter, I explain the process of sample selection, and investigate the 
characteristics of the sample.  The full sample for the dissertation consists of 2,289 long-
term debt issuers and 3,198 short-term debt issuers over the period 1983-1997.  Then, I 
classify timers and non-timers based on term spreads, excess bond returns, a combination 
of the predictions of debt maturity function and excess bond returns, and future bond 
ratings changes.  Based on these classifications, I investigate whether timers have higher 



























IMPACT Of TIMING STRATEGIES ON ANNOUNCEMENT EFFECTS 
OF STRAIGHT DEBT OFFERING 
 
 In this chapter, I test whether timing strategies affect share price response to 
announcements of straight debt offerings using a sample of the long-term debt offerings 
during 1983-1997.  Previous literature shows that the share price response to the 
announcements of straight debt offerings is negative but insignificant.  If timing 
strategies are successful and the motivation of timers is revealed to capital markets at the 
time of debt offerings, then the share price reaction to the announcements for timers can 
be higher than that for non-timers.  I survey the empirical evidence related to straight debt 
offerings, describe the data and research method, and report the empirical results.     
   4.1 Previous Evidence and Hypotheses 
There is substantial evidence that security offerings are generally related to 
abnormal stock returns at the announcement of those issues.  For instance, Asquith and 
Mullins (1986) and Masulis and Korwar (1986) find that the announcement of seasoned 
equity issues leads to about negative three percent abnormal returns on common stock.  
Mikkelson (1981) documents that announcement of the call of convertible bonds results 
in a significant negative return to common stock.  Mikkelson and Partch (1986) find that 
a type of securities offered affect a stock price reaction to the announcements of security 
offerings.  They document that there is a significantly negative stock price reaction to the 
announcements of common stock and convertible debt issues, an insignificantly negative 
reaction to the announcements of straight debt and preferred stock issues, and a strongly 
positive reaction to the announcements of credit agreements.  Smith (1986) reviews the 






evidence shows that the pecking order seems prevalent.  Generally, the issue of riskier 
securities (common stock, convertible preferred stock, and convertible bonds) is 
associated with a strong negative stock price reaction, and the issue of less risky 
securities (preferred stock and straight bonds) is associated with an insignificant stock 
price reaction. 
 The effect of straight debt offerings on stock returns has been examined 
theoretically and empirically.  The issue of long-term debt is a leverage-increasing event.  
Traditional capital structure theory assumes that a firm trades off a corporate tax 
advantage of debt against costs of financial distress, and it maintains target capital 
structure.  Alternatively, Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) agency model obtains optimal 
capital structure by balancing agency costs of debt against agency cost of equity.  From 
these perspectives, the market may consider the announcement of a debt offering as a 
signal that the firm’s capacity to extract tax advantages of debt have increased or that 
agency costs of debt has decreased.  Therefore, the models indicate that the leverage-
increasing event leads to a positive stock price response. 
Myers and Majluf’s (1984) asymmetric information model assumes that managers 
have superior information relative to investors about future investment opportunities.  
Because of adverse selection problems, uninformed investors will demand a discount 
when they buy new securities.  Also, equity issues are more subject to adverse selection 
problems than debt issues because equity is riskier than debt.  Therefore, managers will 
depend on internal financing to finance their investments rather than external financing.  
This model indicates that external financing might be related to the negative valuation 






(1985) signaling model indicates that investors interpret unexpected external financing as 
a signal that issuers’ operating cash flows are lower than expected.  In their model, the 
firm’s managers know more than outsiders about the true state of the firm’s current 
earnings.  The managers can signal their expectation about the earnings estimates through 
a dividend announcement or an external financing announcement.  Their model predicts 
that the stock market reaction to security issues is negatively related to external financing 
and the size of financing.  Also, Ross (1977) model shows that leverage increases can 
signal similar changes in firm earnings prospects to the market.     
Unlike equity-related security issuance, the previous evidence shows that straight 
debt offerings generally do not affect stock prices at the announcement.  Dann and 
Mikkelson (1984) provide evidence on the valuation effects of non-convertible and 
convertible debt issuance.  The announcement of straight debt issue during the years 1970 
through 1979 is associated with marginally negative stock price decrease.  The average 
two-day cumulative abnormal return (CAR) around the announcement is –0.37 percent, 
which is not significant at 10 percent level.  In contrast, they find that the average 
valuation effect on common stock at the announcement of convertible debt is 
significantly negative.  They argue that the results are partially consistent with Myers and 
Majluf’s (1984) pecking order theory.  Pecking order theory implies a decrease in stock 
price at the announcement of external financing, and also posits a less unfavorable 
response to new debt financing than to equity related financing. 
Eckbo (1986) also analyzes the effect of corporate debt offerings on stock prices.  
His sample consists of 648 issues of straight debt (of which 189 are mortgage bonds) and 






and Mikkelson (1984), the announcement of convertible debt issue elicits a significantly 
negative mean valuation effect, but the announcement of straight debt issue does not 
produce any significant abnormal stock returns.  Regardless of offering method, use of 
bonds, issue size, tax shield of the issue, bond ratings, and the abnormal change in the 
issuing firm’s earnings in the period immediately following the offering, the effect of 
straight debt issue on stock price is not significant.  He argues that the difference between 
the market reactions to straight debt vs. convertible debt is consistent with the Myers and 
Majluf (1984) model.  However, the finding that the bond ratings (risk measure) are not 
related to the abnormal returns is difficult to square with the asymmetric information 
model.             
Mikkelson and Partch (1986) examine the stock price effects of various types of 
security offerings and investigate the nature of information inferred by investors from 
offering announcements.  They find that changes in stock price at the announcements of 
security offerings are determined by the type of security, but they are not related to 
characteristics of offerings such as proceeds, capital structure change, and the rating of 
debt issues.  They document that there is a significant negative stock price reaction to the 
announcements of common stock and convertible debt issues, and an insignificant 
negative reaction to the announcements of straight debt and preferred stock issues.  They 
also find that there is a strong positive reaction to the announcements of credit 
agreements.  These results are consistent with Myers and Majluf’s (1984) argument that 
the market infers that a security is overpriced when a common stock or convertible debt 






The papers in the later period analyze stock market reaction to announcements of 
straight debt offering based on characteristics of debt issues or issuers like debt seniority, 
bond rating, or dividend payout ratios.  Shyam-Sunder (1991) finds that there is no 
monotonic relation between stock price response around straight debt offering and bond 
rating, and there is no significant difference across risk classes, using bond ratings as a 
risk measure.  She indicates that even though Eckbo (1986) analyzes the relation between 
share price response and bond ratings, he includes only 5 debt issues rated Ba and below 
out of 222 industrial straight debt offerings.  Her sample includes 79 non-investment 
grade or un-rated debt issues out of 297 straight debt issues.  Even though she includes a 
relatively large number of low-grade debt issues in the paper, she does not find any 
significant difference between stock price responses to the announcements of investment 
grade and non-investment grade issues. 
Tang and Singer (1993) examine the effect of debt seniority on market reaction.  
They show that for the 77 subordinated debt offerings over the period, 1979-1986, the 
average two-day cumulative abnormal return is –1.44 percent and is significantly 
different from zero.  For the 178 non-subordinated debt offering, the average two-day 
cumulative abnormal return is 0.29 percent and is not significant.  Also, the mean 
difference between non-subordinated and subordinated offering is significant with a t – 
statistic of 4.03.  However, they show that other characteristics, the proceeds, tax effect, 
maturity, and shelf registration or non-shelf registration, are not related to the 
announcement effect.  They argue that the results generally support the Myers and Majluf 






and subordinated offering and no significant relationship between the size of offering and 
stock response are not consistent with Miller and Rock (1985) predictions.        
Johnson (1995) examines stock price response to announcements of straight debt 
issues across low and high dividend payout firms.  Jensen (1986) argues that both debt 
and dividend payments can reduce free cash flow problem, which managers can invest 
unprofitable projects with redundant cash flows.  Also, debt or dividend payments can 
serve as a signaling mechanism of future earnings or firm quality by committing to cash 
outflows.  The paper shows that the stock price response to debt offering is significantly 
positive for low growth-low dividend payout firms, and is negatively related to dividend 
payout cross-sectionally.  Yet, stock price response to debt offering is not significant for 
high dividend payout firms.  The results imply that debt-service payments and dividends 
are substitutes to reduce agency costs or to serve as a signaling mechanism.  
In this chapter, I tests whether financial managers’ timing strategies based on 
public information or private information result in any positive stock price responses to 
the announcements of straight debt issues.  I test the following two main hypotheses: 
 
0H : The average abnormal stock return at the announcement of straight debt 
offerings is equal to zero. 
 
 
0H : The announcement effect of straight debt offering for timers is equal to that 
for non-timers. 
 
4.2 Data Description and Event Study Methodology 
4.2.1 Data Description 
To construct the sample for event study, I start with 2,289 straight long-term debt 






announcement dates of each issue, I use three sources, Lexis-Nexis Business News, Wall 
Street Journal Index (WSJI), and a filing date from SDC.  I primarily use the dates 
reported about the offering for the first time in Lexis-Nexis and WSJI as announcement 
dates.  For issues that are not reported in the two sources, I use filing dates from SDC as 
announcement dates.20  When I check the announcement dates, I also look at whether 
those issues are made with equity or convertible debt simultaneously.  I remove those 
dual issues of debt and equity from the sample because Masulis and Korwar (1986) and 
Billingsley, Smith, and Lamy (1994) show that dual issues are accompanied by 
significantly negative announcement effects, consistent with general findings about 
equity issues.  To confirm whether I still have dual issues and to remove them, I double-
check filing dates of common stock, preferred stock, and convertible debt issues from 
SDC.  After these screens, I have 1,716 debt issues with announcement dates.  I use the 
announcement date (day 0) and previous trading day (day –1) as event dates.   
Then, I match those debt issues with daily stock return data from Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP).  To be included in final sample, the stock for those 
issuers should be traded on the event dates and estimation period, day +21 through day 
+170.  The final sample in the event study consists of 1,423 straight long-term debt 
offerings. 
Other characteristics related to those issues like bond rating at the time of issue, 
lead underwriter, the type of security, and proceeds are obtained from SDC.  Also, the 
leverage change in the year of issue, firm size, market to book ratio, bond ratings in 
                                                 
20 I find that SDC record filing dates of straight debt issues sparsely in the 1980s.  The announcement dates 






subsequent years, sales growth, and dividend payout ratio are obtained from Research 
Insight.   
4.2.2 Research Method 
Since Fama, Fisher, Jensen, and Roll (1969) used event study methodology in 
their research, the methodology has been a common research tool in finance area.  For 
instance, Henderson (1990) indicates that event studies are used in 40 papers published in 
Journal of Finance and Journal of Financial Economics during 1987 and 1988.  I 
primarily use event study methods in this chapter. 
The underlying model in a typical event study is that the stock return follows a 
market model of Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965), 
 
=itr itmtii r εβα ++ , 
where itr  is the return on for firm i  on day t , iα and iβ are market model parameters, mtr  
is the return on the CRSP value weighted index for day t , and itε is error term.  Ordinary 
least-squares regression is performed to obtain estimates of ia  and ib of iα and iβ , using 
the return data of a 150-day estimation period, day –170 to day –21 or day +21 to day 
+171.  This estimation method assumes that the joint distribution of returns is stationary 
through time, and satisfies the ordinary least-squares assumptions.  Also, the regression 
over the estimation period provides an unbiased estimate of residual variance during the 
estimation period, 
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 These estimated parameters are used to calculate prediction errors during the 
forecast period or event dates (day –1 and day 0).  Since the errors are estimated for 
observations which were not used in the estimation of the parameters, they are not 
residuals in the strict ordinary least squares regression.  The abnormal return for firm i  
on day t , which is a prediction error, is defined as 
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To calculate two-day cumulative abnormal returns for each firm i  ( iCAR ), I add the 
abnormal returns on day –1 and day 0.  Then, I calculate the average two-day abnormal 
return (ACAR) for each sample, and test the null hypothesis that ACAR is equal to zero 
for a given sample.  Assuming that the cumulative abnormal returns are cross-sectionally 
and intertermporally independent, the appropriate test statistic21 is 
 













































and where mr is the mean return on CRSP value weighted index over the estimation 
period.  In the formula for variance of cumulative abnormal returns, the term in the 
bracket reflects the increase in variance due to prediction outside of the estimation period. 
                                                 






Also, the formula reflects contemporaneous and intertemporal correlation of estimated 
abnormal returns. 
 I report the average two-day cumulative abnormal return with z-statistics, as well 
as the median, minimum, and maximum of two-day cumulative abnormal returns, sample 
size, and the percentage of positive cumulative abnormal returns for full sample and sub-
samples based on timing strategies.  Also, I report the results of mean difference test (t-
test) and non-parametric median difference test (Kruskal-Wallis test) between two sub-
samples.22  Then, using regression analysis, I test the relationship between cumulative 
abnormal returns and timing strategies after controlling for other variables that might 
affect the announcement effects. 
 4.3 Empirical Results 
 4.3.1 Event Study Results     
 Panel A of Table 7 shows the event study results around announcements of 
straight debt offering for the full sample in which market models are estimated using pre-
event estimation period, day –170 through –21.  The mean two-day cumulative abnormal 
return (CAR) is - 0.18 percent with z-statistics of –0.05, which means that the average 
CAR is not significantly different from zero.  The median is –0.22 percent and the 
percentage of the positive cumulative abnormal returns is about 45 percent.  This 
negative and insignificant announcement effect to straight debt offering is consistent with 
findings in Dann and Mikkelson (1984) and Eckbo (1986). 
 
                                                 
22 Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are prediction errors from market model estimation.  Therefore, I 







Table 7.  Announcement Effects of Long-term Debt Issues  
In Panel A, the CARs are calculated as prediction errors from a market model regression with an estimation 
period of t - 21 to t - 170 day.  From Panel B, the CARs are calculated as prediction errors from a market 
model regression with an estimation period of t + 21 to t +170 day. 
 
Panel A. Full Sample – Pre-event estimation period 




1416 -.18 % 
(z = -.05) 
 
-.22 % -29.26 % 12.09 % 45.13 % 
 
 
Panel B. Full Sample – Post-event estimation period 




1423 -.09 % 
(z = -.02) 
 
-.16 % -29.28 % 12.97 % 46.42 % 
 
 
Panel C. Investment grade bonds vs. speculative grade and non-rated bonds 








Wallis test  
( 2χ ) 
Investment 
grade bonds 
965 -.09 % 
(z = -.02) 
 




458 -.09 % 
(z = -.01) 
 









 Panel B shows the similar event study results in which market models estimated 
using post-event estimation period, day 21 to 170.  Hamada (1970) show that with a fixed 
amount of equity, borrowing will increases the risk to the investor and thus beta for the 
capital asset pricing model.  To control for the increase of risk by the leverage-increase 
event, I use post-event estimation period in Panel B.  The results in Panel B are similar to 







 I divide the sample to two sub-samples based on bond ratings, and report the 
event study results on the two sub-samples in Panel C.  The percentage of long-term debt 
issues with investment-grade ratings is about 67.8 percent, which implies that the firms 
tend to issue long-term bonds when they have higher ratings.  The average CARs of two 
sub-samples are almost identical with - .09 percent.  The corresponding z-statistics show 
that the mean CARs are not statistically different from zero.  The median of CARs for 
investment grade bonds is almost identical to that for speculative grade bonds and non-
rated bonds.  The mean difference test (t-test) and non-parametric difference test 
(Kruskal-Wallis test) show that the means and medians of CARs between two-
subsamples are not significantly different from each other.  Also, the percentage of 
positive CARs for two sub-samples are below 50 percent.  These results are consistent 
with the findings in Eckbo (1986), Mikkelson and Partch (1986), and Shyam-Sunder 
(1991).  They find that there is no significant difference in announcement effects of 
straight debt offerings across risk classes. Yet, the results are not consistent with Myers 
and Majluf (1984) model that issuance of riskier securities should elicit a less favorable 
response from stock investors. 
 Then, I investigate whether various timing strategies have an effect on the 
announcement effects of straight debt offering, and present the results in Table 8.  Panel 
A shows the result based on naïve strategy which implies that timers choose long-term 
debt when term spread is low and non-timers choose long-term debt when term spread is 
high.  Based on this classification, 54 percent of long-term debt issuers follow the naïve 
timing strategy.  Timers have marginally less negative effects (the mean of -0.002 percent 







Table 8.  The Impact of Timing Strategies on the Announcement Effects of Long-term 
               Debt Issues 
 
Panel A. Naïve Strategy based on term spread 








Wallis test  
( 2χ ) 
Non-timers 653 -.20 % 
(z = -.05) 
 
-.21 % 45.79 % 
Timers 770 -.002 % 
(z = -.0003) 
 










Panel B. Complex strategy based on actual excess bond returns 








Wallis test  
( 2χ ) 
Non-timers 886 -.18 % 
(z = -.03) 
 
-.19 % 45.49 % 
Timers 537 .06% 
(z = .01) 
 









Panel C. Complex strategy based on one-year-ahead excess bond returns 








Wallis test  
( 2χ ) 
Non-timers 766 -.21 % 
(z = -.03) 
 
-.17 % 45.95 % 
Timers 657 .05 % 
(z = .01) 
 









Panel D. Complex strategy based on three-year-ahead excess bond returns 








Wallis test  
( 2χ ) 
Non-timers 340 -.17 % 
(z = -.01) 
 
-.22 % 44.12 % 
Timers 1,083 -.07 % 
(z = -.01) 
 













Panel E. Timing strategy based on the combination of debt maturity function and one-year-ahead excess 
               bond returns  








Wallis test  
( 2χ ) 
Non-timers 881 -.18 % 
(z = -.03) 
 
-.17 % 46.08 % 
Timers 259 .08 % 
(z = .01) 
 










Panel F. Timing strategy based on future bond ratings change 








Wallis test  
( 2χ ) 
Non-timers 1,029 -.04 % 
(z = -.01) 
 
-.13 % 47.33 % 
Timers 172 -.34 % 
(z = -.01) 
 









0.21 percent), but the difference between two sub-samples is not statistically significant.  
Also, the means of CARs for two sub-samples are not significantly different from zero, 
and the percentage of positive CARs is below 50 percent. 
 I use actual excess bond returns to divide timers and non-timers (i.e., the complex 
strategy), and present the result in Panel B.  Timers choose long-term debt when excess 
bond returns are negative and non-timers choose long-term debt when excess bond 
returns are positive.  Following this strategy, 37.74 percent of long-term debt issuers are 
classified timers.  Timers have 0.06 percent abnormal returns and non-timers have -0.18 
percent abnormal returns on average at the announcement of the debt offerings.  






 In Panel C, timers and non-timers are classified based on one-year-ahead excess 
bond returns.  Timers choose long-term debt when the predicted excess bond returns are 
relatively low and non-timers choose long-term debt when the predicted excess bond 
returns are relatively high.  The mean difference and median difference is 0.26 percent 
and 0.60 percent, respectively, but the difference is not statistically significant. 
 In Panel D, I assume that timers choose long-term debt when three-year-ahead 
excess bond returns are low and non-timers choose long-term debt when three-year-ahead 
excess bond returns are high.  There are relatively high portion of timers because three-
year-ahead excess bond returns are relatively low in 1990s as seen in Panel C of Figure 2.  
Therefore, long-term debt issuers in 1990s are classified as timers.  The results are not 
qualitatively different from those using the other two previous complex strategies. 
 In Panel E, I assume that timers issue long-term debt to follow complex timing 
strategy even though debt maturity function predicts short-term debt issuance.  Non-
timers issue long-term debt following the prediction of debt maturity function.  Of 1,140 
long-term debt issuers with predictions available from debt maturity function, 22.72 
percent of the issuers are timers.  The timers have 0.08 percent abnormal return and non-
timers have -0.18 percent abnormal returns on average, but the difference is not 
significant.  Also, the median difference is not significant. 
 In Panel F, timers are assumed to issue long-term debt expecting subsequent 
ratings downgrades within three years after the issuance, and non-timers experience no 
change or upgrades in bond ratings after the issuance.  The timers experience slightly 






different.  Also, the proportion of positive abnormal returns is about 40 percent for 
timers, which is relatively low compared to other sub-samples. 
 In summary, the event study results show that straight debt offering is associated 
with abnormal stock returns around announcements of long-term debt offerings that are 
not statistically different from zero, which is consistent with the findings in the previous 
literature.  I also test whether various timing strategies using market interest rates or 
private information about future bond ratings changes have an effect on stock returns, and 
find that implementing any type of timing strategy does not have a significant effect on 
stock returns at the announcements of the long-term debt offering. 
 4.3.2 Multivariate Regression Results 
 I use weighted least squares regressions to investigate whether various timing 
strategies are associated with the abnormal stock returns at the announcements of straight 
debt offerings after controlling for explanatory variables used in the previous literature.  
The results are in Table 9.  The dependent variable is the two-day cumulative abnormal 
returns (CARs), and each observation is weighted by the respective inverse of the 
standard prediction errors of CARs to adjust for heteroskedasticity.  Model 1 includes 
relative issue size (proceeds divided by market value of equity), dummy variable for 
investment grade bonds, dummy variable for non-rated bonds, a natural log of three-year 
average dividend payout ratio, and a natural log of Carter-Manaster’s (C-M) underwriter 
ranks as explanatory variables.   
 With reference to Miller and Rock’s (1985) model in which the unanticipated 
amount of new financing signals the manager’s private information about their future  






Table 9.  Weighted Least Square Regression Results 
Dependent variable is the two-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs).  T-statistics are in parentheses. 
Observations are weighted by the respective inverse of the standard prediction errors of CARs to adjust for 
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*Indicates significant difference at 10 percent level. 








and Partch (1986), and Johnson (1995), I find a statistically insignificant relation between 
the relative size and the abnormal returns.  These results do not support Miller and 
Rock’s (1985) theoretical model.  Two dummy variables to represent investment grade 
bonds and non-rated bonds, which measure the risk of securities, are included.  Myers 
and Majluf (1984) model shows that investors might react less favorably to the issuance 
of riskier securities.   Consistent with Eckbo (1986), Mikkelson and Partch (1986), 
Shyam-Sunder (1991), and Johnson (1995), I find no significant relation between bond 
ratings and the stock return response to straight debt offering.  Yet, the coefficient on 
dummy variable for non-rated bonds is negatively significant at five percent level, which 
is consistent with Myers and Majluf (1984) model. 
 Following Johnson (1995), I include the natural log of the three-year average 
dividend payout ratio as a control variable.  The dividend payout ratio is cash dividends 
paid on common stock divided by earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued 
operations less preferred dividend requirements.23  He finds that share price response is 
significantly positive for low growth-low dividend payout firms, and argues that debt 
service payments can be served as an effective substitute for dividends.  However, the 
coefficient on log of dividend payout ratio is insignificantly negative, which is not 
consistent with Johnson’s findings.  I include the natural log of Carter-Manaster’s 
underwriter ranks to investigate whether reputation of underwriters can mitigate the 
negative stock price response to straight debt offerings.  The coefficient on the variable is 
insignificantly negative.  In unreported regressions, I also use market shares of 
                                                 
23 Johnson (1995) measures a dividend payout ratio as cash dividends paid on common stock divided by net 
income.  Yet, since I use dividend payout ratios to proxy for future cash outflow commitments, it would be 
better to use earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations as a denominator to calculate 






underwriters as reputation measures for underwriters instead of Carter-Manaster’s 
underwriter ranks and find results qualitatively similar to those reported in Model 1. 
 From Model 2 to Model 5, I include dummy variables representing various timing 
strategies based on market interest rates to investigate whether timing strategies are cross-
sectionally associated with the stock price response to straight debt offerings.  In Model 
2, 3, and 5, the coefficients on dummy variables for naïve strategy, complex strategy, and 
combination of debt maturity function and complex strategy are insignificantly positive.  
In Model 4, I include an interaction term between dummy variable for complex strategy 
and dummy variable for highly ranked underwriters, which have the highest and the 
second highest ranks in Carter and Manaster’s tombstone rankings.  The coefficient on 
the interaction term is insignificantly negative, which implies that the timing strategies do 
not affect the stock price response to the announcements of straight debt offerings 
regardless of whether those offerings are underwritten by prestigious underwriters.  In 
Model 6, I include a dummy variable for timing strategy based on future rating changes.  
The coefficient on the dummy variable is insignificantly negative.  Overall, regardless of 
how I classify timers and non-timers, the multivariate regression results show that 
attempting to time debt markets does not increase the abnormal stock returns around the 
announcement effects of straight debt offering after controlling for other determinants.   
The results are consistent with those from the event study. 
 In this chapter, I show that timing strategies are not associated with stock price 
changes at the time of long-term debt issuance.  There are two limitations of the study in 
this chapter.  First, I have only investigated the impact of timing strategies on stock price 






different maturities spectrum, financial managers can increase firm value without 
affecting stock prices if capital markets are segmented.  Second, if investors are able to 
discern financial managers’ motivation to follow timing strategies and their abilities, they 
could have already reflected the effect of timing strategies in stock prices or bond prices.  
These concerns might be a reason that I do not find any significant result in this chapter.  
In following two chapters, I address these two problems and complement the research 







































IMPACT OF TIMING STRATEGIES ON FIRM VALUE 
The main objective of this research is to test whether timing debt markets reduces 
the overall cost of capital and increases firm value.  In the previous chapter, I find no 
evidence that timing strategies increase stock returns at the announcements of straight 
debt offering.  In this chapter, I try to complement the results of event study in two ways.  
If timing strategies can reduce overall cost of capital in a firm and if investors have 
already realized the motivation of timing strategies and the abilities of timers, then timers 
should have higher firm value than non-timers even before timers implement their 
strategies through a new debt issue.  Thus, I first test whether timers have higher firm 
value than non-timers by analyzing Tobin’s q across timers and non-timers.  I use q as a 
measure of firm value.  Second, I investigate changes in q (from before to after the debt 
issues) across timers and non-timers to test whether the motivation of timing strategies is 
revealed to the capital markets after those strategies are implemented.   
5.1 Tobin’s q 
Theoretically, q is defined as the ratio of the market value of the firm to the 
replacement cost of its assets.  If q is greater than one, it means that a firm is assumed to 
use its assets better by capital markets than its next best alternative, its replacement costs.  
q has been widely used in the finance literature to measure firm value.  For example, 
McConnell and Servaes (1990) and Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) examine whether 
q is related to ownership structure.  Lang and Litzenberger (1989) use q to measure over-
investment when they examine the impact of dividend announcements on stock prices.  






between corporate diversification and firm performance.  Also, Lang, Stulz, and 
Walkling (1989), Yermack (1996), and Park and Song (1995) use q to examine the 
relationship between managerial performance and tender offer gains, the relationship 
between board size and firm performance, and the relationship among firm performance, 
employee stock ownership plans, and monitoring by outside blockholders, respectively.       
 Even though q is commonly used in many empirical papers in corporate finance, 
it is hard to calculate accurate q values due to unavailability of data, especially market 
value of debt and replacement costs of firm assets.  Many papers have followed the 
methodology developed by Lindenberg and Ross (1981) to estimate the replacement of 
costs of inventory and fixed assets.  To calculate the replacement costs they select an 
initiation date on which the replacement cost of the assets is assumed to be equal to their 
book values.  Then, they use an algorithm to estimate the replacement costs for 
subsequent years by considering increase in book assets, depreciation expense, and 
inflation rate.  This procedure is computationally complex and requires substantial 
historical data that may not be available.  The Manufacturing Sector Master File 
compiled at the National Bureau Economic Research (NBER) uses similar approach to 
calculate the replacement costs, but the database is not available after 1987.  These 
approaches have a problem that the initiation date is ad hoc, and replacement costs 
depend on the starting date.  In addition, the NBER approach does not use actual market 
value of long-term debt, but is based on the assumption that all long-term debt has an 
original maturity of 20 years, estimates market value using a matrix of bond prices in 
year t for bonds due in year s from the Moody’s corporate BAA bond price series.  This 






research because changes in interest rates following timing strategies can affect the 
market value of debt securities. 
 Chung and Pruitt (1994) show that their “approximate q” (hereafter C-P q) is 
highly correlated to Lindenberg and Ross’s (1981) more theoretically correct model.  
They show that at least 96.6 percent of the variability of Lindenberg and Ross q is 
explained by their q.  In this chapter, since the data necessary to perform the more 
exhaustive Lindenberg and Ross’ q calculations are not available for many observations, 
I use the C-P q, defined as follows:  
 
C-P q = (MVE + PS + DEBT)/TA, 
 
where MVE is market value of equity, PS is the liquidating value of the firm’s 
outstanding preferred stock, DEBT is the value of the firm’s short-term liabilities net of 
its short-term assets plus the book value of the firm’s long-term debt, and TA is the book 
value of the total assets of the firm.   The advantage of using C-P q is that I can simply 
use accounting data available from Research Insight to calculate q.     
5.2 Empirical Results on C-P q 
5.2.1 Characteristics of Timers and Non-timers  
Before investigating impact of timing strategies on firm value, I first compare 
characteristics of timers vs. non-timers and report the results in Table 10.  I classify 
timers as firms following complex strategy based on one-year-ahead excess bond returns.   
Timers are assumed to issue short-term debt (long-term debt) when the predicted excess 






Table 10. Characteristics of Timers and Non-timers 
The table reports the number of timers and non-timers based on complex strategy using one-year ahead 
excess bond returns as well as the mean and median of each variable and mean and median difference test 
results (t-test and non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test) across two sub-samples.    C-P q is market value of 
equity plus liquidation value of preferred stock plus book value of debt divided by book value of total 
assets. Total assets are presented in million dollars.  Long-term leverage ratio is long-term debt divided by 
total assets.  Dividend payout ratio indicates three-year average of cash dividends paid to common stock 
holders divided by earnings before extraordinary and discontinued items. Market to book ratio of equity is 
the ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity.  R&D to sales ratio is research & development 
expenditure divided by net sales.  Insider ownership is the ratio of shares owned by executives and 
directors to the number of shares of common stock outstanding. 
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term debt) when excess bond returns are low (high).  Based on this classification, 2,574 
firms (47 percent) are timers out of the full sample of 5,487 firms.   
Following Chung and Pruitt (1994), I calculate q in the year when timers and non-
timers issue long-term debt or short-term debt.  The mean of C-P q for timers (1.17), 
which measures firm value, is slightly lower than that for non-timers (1.18), but the mean 
difference test (t-test) shows no significant difference.  Also, the medians of q for the two 
sub-samples are identical based on the median difference test (Kruskal-Wallis test).  To 
compare the average firm size, I examine total assets of the firms.  The mean and median 
total assets of firms for non-timers are about $5.7 billon and $1.3 billion, which compares 
respectively to about $5.3 billion and $1.4 billion for non-timers.  Mean and median 
difference tests show no significant differences between the two sub-samples.  The mean 
and median long-term leverage ratios (0.38 and 0.37) for timers are the same as those for 
non-timers.  The mean and median dividend payout ratios for timers (0.47 and 0.36) are 
slightly higher than those for non-timers (0.45 and 0.35), but the mean and median 
difference tests indicate no significant differences.  To compare growth opportunities 
between two sub-samples, I examine market-to-book ratio of equity and ratio of research 
& development expenditure to sales.  The mean (median) market-to-book ratio of equity 
for timers, 2.50 (1.82), is slightly lower than that for non-timers, 2.53 (1.84), but the 
difference tests are not statistically significant.  The ratios of research & development 
expenditure to sales are similar between two sub-samples.  The mean (median) inside 
ownership for timers, 10.56 (2.16) percent, is lower than that for non-timers, 15.11 (2.74) 
percent.  The mean difference test shows no significant difference, but the median 






timers have similar characteristics in terms of firm value (C-P q), firm size, leverage, 
dividend policy, growth opportunities (market-to-book and R&D to sales), and inside 
ownership, compared to non-timers.       
5.2.2 Univariate Test Results on C-P q 
Panel A of Table 11 compares C-P q for timers with that for non-timers.   The 
classification between market-timers and non market-timers is based on the naïve timing 
strategy.  I assume that firms are timers when they issue long-term debt (short-term debt) 
when term spread is lower (higher) than the median term spread (2.40 percent), and firms 
are non-timers when they issue long-term debt (short-term debt) when term spread is 
higher (lower) than the median.  The mean and median C-P q for non-timers are almost 
equal to those for timers.  The mean difference test (t-test) and nonparametric median 
difference test (Kruskal-Wallis test) show that C-P q is not significantly different between 
timers and non-timers. 
Panels B, C, and D report the univariate test results on C-P q between two sub-
samples based on the complex timing strategy.  In Panel B, I assume that timers issue 
long-term debt (short-term debt) when actual excess bond returns are negative (positive) 
and vice versa.  In Panel C and D, I use the median values of one-year-ahead excess bond 
returns and three-year-ahead excess bond returns to classify timers and non-timers, 
respectively, and assume that timers issue long-term debt (short-term debt) when the 
excess bond returns are lower (higher) than the median value and vice versa.  The results 
in the Panel B, C, and D show that timers have slightly lower q than non-timers, but the 
mean and median difference tests show that there exists only marginal difference between 






Table 11. Impact of Timing Strategies on Firm Value (Univariate Test Results on C-P q) 
The table reports the number of timers and non-timers based on various classification methods as well as 
the mean and median of q (C-P q), and the mean and median difference test results (t-test and non-
parametric Kruskal-Wallis test) across two sub-samples.  C-P q is market value of equity plus liquidation 
value of preferred stock plus book value of debt divided by book value of total assets. 
 
































































































































































Panel E. Timing strategy based on the combination of debt maturity function and one-year-ahead excess 























































































































In Panel E, I assume that timers issue debt at a different maturity spectrum than 
predicted by the debt maturity function in order to follow a complex strategy based on 
one-year-ahead excess bond returns.  Timers have slightly higher q with a mean of 1.21 
(a median of 1.04) than non-timers with a mean of 1.17 (a median of 1.01), but the mean 







In summary, the results show that although managers try to time debt markets 
based on market interest rates, term spread or excess bond returns, they do not succeed in 
increasing firm value.  Because investors might figure out whether firms are timers or not 
even before they implement timing strategies, I estimate q one year before they issue debt 
securities and compare qs across timers and non-timers.  The unreported results show that 
timers do not have significant different firm values compared to non-timers, consistent 
with the results in the year when timers (or non-timers) issue long- or short-term debt. 
In Panel F, I assume that timers have private information about their future bond 
rating changes following Flannery (1986).  Timers are assumed to issue short-term debt 
when they expect their bond ratings to improve at least two grades within three years 
after debt security issuance.  Timers are also assumed to issue long-term debt when they 
expect their bond ratings to deteriorate within the period.  Interestingly, timers have 
lower q with the mean of 1.05 (the median of 0.92) than non-timers with the mean of 1.23 
(the median of 1.06).  Both the mean and median differences are statistically significant 
at 1 percent level.  To investigate the results further, I divide the timers based on 
upgrades or downgrades.  Of the 283 timers, 216 firms issue long-term debt expecting 
their bond ratings to fall (at least two grades) within three years after the issuance.  I 
compare the average q of those 216 timers with the average q of non-timers whose bond 
ratings do not improve, and report the results in Panel G.  The mean and median 
differences are larger than those in Panel F, and are statistically significant at 1 percent 
level.  However, in unreported tests, I find that if I compare the average q of timers who 
issue short-term debt expecting bond ratings upgrades with that of non-timers, the mean 






and non-timers one year before debt issuance, and find that the results are similar.  In 
summary, investors might have already predicted bond ratings changes, and reflected 
timers’ motivation to issue long-term debt based on future rating downgrades in firm 
value.  This explains the findings that timers have lower firm value than non-timers when 
I classify timers based on future bond rating changes.         
In general, univariate test results show that even though firm managers try to time 
the debt market based on market interest rates, firm value for timers is not statistically 
different from that for non-timers.  If financial managers try to time the debt market 
based on their future bond rating changes, firm value for timers is significantly lower 
than that for non-timers.  The results indicate that firm managers do not time the debt 
market successfully. 
5.2.3 Multivariate Regression Results on C-P q 
Previous literature shows that firm value is related to financing, dividend, 
compensation policies, ownership structure, growth opportunities, and the magnitude of 
diversification of firms.  Therefore, these variables need to be controlled for when testing 
whether timing strategies affect q.   
 First, we control for leverage effects.  Because the sample firms for this research 
issue long-term debt or short-term debt, their leverage ratios will increase in the year 
when they issue the debt securities.  Myers (1977) argues that if the firm has risky debt 
outstanding, it may have to pass up positive NPV projects because the created value from 
the potential projects will go to bondholders instead of shareholders.  This argument 
suggests that for firms with high growth opportunities, leverage will be negatively related 






debt can be thought of as a bonding mechanism to force a firm to pay out excess cash.  
Therefore, an increase in leverage ratio will reduce free cash flow and agency costs, and 
will increase firm value.  In other words, the leverage ratio could be positively or 
negatively related to firm value, as measured by q.  Thus, I include the change in leverage 
ratio from previous year as a control variable. 
 Second, I control for dividend effects.  Rozeff (1982) argues that external capital 
markets reduce agency costs by providing effective monitoring.  The firms paying higher 
dividends have lower free cash flow and tend to go to external markets to raise capital 
more frequently.  Miller and Rock (1985) show that dividends serve to signal future 
earnings.  Also, Jensen (1986) implies that firms with more positive NPV investment 
opportunities have less free cash flow and pay lower dividends.  Smith and Watts (1992) 
find that firms with more growth options have lower leverage, lower dividend yields, and 
higher executive compensation.  These papers predict that dividend payout ratios are 
positively related to q.  I include the three-year average dividend payout ratio in the 
regression analysis to control for dividend effects.   
Third, I control for insider ownership.  Once the manager sells a fraction of his 
common shares to outside investors, he does not bear full costs associated with a perk he 
consumes.24  Therefore, as ownership gets more diffuse, agency costs will increase 
causing firm value to decrease.  The competing argument is that as insider ownership 
increases, managers entrench themselves in a firm and increase agency costs.  This 
management entrenchment hypothesis predicts a negative relation between insider 
ownership and firm value.  Empirically, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) find that large firms 
have highly diffuse ownership structures.  Yet, they find no linear relation between 
                                                 






ownership concentration and the accounting profit rate.  McConnell and Servaes (1990) 
find a curvilinear relation between q and insider ownership.  They document that the 
curve slope is positive until insider ownership reaches 40-50 percent and turns negative 
after the point.  Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) find a significant non-monotonic 
relation between management ownership and market valuation of the firm as measured 
by Tobin’s q.  Their results suggest “a positive relation between ownership and q in the 
zero percent to five percent board ownership range, a negative and less pronounced 
relation in the five percent to 25 percent, and perhaps a further positive relation beyond 
25 percent.”  These results are consistent with both the convergence of interest and 
entrenchment effects.  I include the percentage of shares owned by executives and 
directors in the regression to explain q.  
Fourth, q can be related to the magnitude of diversification of sample firms.  Lang 
and Stulz (1994) and Berger and Ofek (1995) argue that diversification can lead to loss in 
firm value.  They argue that conglomerates are not even average firms in terms of 
Tobin’s q.  To control for the magnitude of diversification of sample firms, I include the 
number of segments of the firms.  The number of segments is not available in Research 
Insight for many observations in the sample, which limits the use of this variable in the 
analyses. 
Finally, I control for bond ratings to explain the variation in q.  Pinches and 
Singleton (1978) find abnormal high or low returns before changes in the rating, and 
argue that the improved (deteriorated) financial and operating conditions of the firms are 
realized by the capital markets long before the rating changes occur.  Holthausen and 






announcement of bond rating downgrades, but they do not experience abnormal returns at 
the announcement of bond rating upgrades.  They also find that the difference between 
the one-year pre-announcement returns for upgrades and downgrades are about 20 to 30 
percent.  Dichev and Piotroski (2001) investigate long-run stock returns following bond 
ratings changes, and find abnormal returns following downgrades and no abnormal 
returns following upgrades.  They also find that bond ratings changes predict earnings 
changes.  This evidence indicates that bond rating and bond ratings changes should be 
associated with firm value.  I include a dummy variable equal to one if the bond is 
investment grade and zero otherwise. 
Univariate test results show that timers do not have higher value than non-timers.  
I estimate multivariate regression equations to examine whether timers have higher firm 
values than non-timers even after controlling for other determinants mentioned in the 
above, and report the results in Table 12.  Model 1 includes only control variables. C-P q 
is significantly positively related to firm size (log of assets), which measured as a natural 
log of assets.  Long-term leverage ratio is measured as the ratio of book value of long-
term debt to total assets.  Changes in long-term leverage from previous year are 
negatively related to q, which is marginally significant.  Leverage can increase the 
present value of bankruptcy costs, but reduce the agency costs in Jensen (1986).  The 
result is not consistent with the agency theory argument.  Miller and Rock (1985), and 
Rozeff (1982) and Jensen (1986) argue that dividends can be served to signal the future 
earnings and to reduce agency costs.  These models predict a positive relation between 
dividend payout ratio and firm value.  Dividend payout ratio in the model indicates three-






Table 12. Multivariate Regression Results on C-P q 
 The dependent variable is C-P q.  LT leverage change from previous year is change in long-term debt 
divided by assets from previous year.  Dividend payout ratio indicates three-year average of dividends paid 
on common stockholders divided by earnings before extraordinary and discontinued operations.   Dummy 
for timing strategy is a qualitative variable taking 1 for market timers and 0 for non-market timers, which 
are classified based on term spread (naïve strategy), EBR 0 (actual excess bond returns), EBR 1 (one-year 
ahead excess bond returns), combination of debt maturity function and EBR 1, and ratings change within 
three years after the issuance. 
 































































































Dummy for timing 
strategy 
   - Naïve strategy 
 .002 
(.07) 
    
   - Complex strategy 
      based on EBR 0 
 
  .04 
(1.28) 
   
-  Complex strategy 
    based on EBR 1 
   .03 
(.83) 
  
  -  Combination of debt 
      maturity function and  
      EBR 1 
    .02 
(.50) 
 
  -  Future ratings change      -.20*** 
(-4.31) 
 
N 2,848 2,848 2,848 2,848 2,846 2,041 
Adjusted 2R  .03 .03 .03 .03 .03 .03 
The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics, which are calculated based on White heteroscedasticity 
consistent estimator.  






discontinued operations.  The result shows a negative but insignificant relation between 
dividend payout ratio and q, which is inconsistent with the predictions.  Bond ratings 
measure the default risk of bonds, and are expected to be positively associated with firm 
value.  The coefficient on dummy variable for investment grade bonds is significantly 
positive, which is consistent with the prediction.  Then, I include inside ownership and 
the square term of insider ownership following Morck et al. (1988) and McConnell and 
Servaes (1990).  Consistent with the results in those papers, firm value and inside 
ownership show a curvilinear relation.  The coefficient on inside ownership is 
significantly positive, and the coefficient on the square term of inside ownership is 
significantly negative. 
From Model 2 to Model 5, I include dummy variables representing timers that are 
classified based on market interest rates.  In Model 2, timers follow a naïve strategy 
based on term spread.  The results show that timers do not have significantly higher q 
than non-timers. In Models 3 and 4 timers follow a complex strategy based on actual 
excess bond returns and one-year-ahead excess bond returns; the results show that timers 
do not have significantly higher q than non-timers.  In Model 5 I assume that timers issue 
debt securities at different maturity spectrum from predictions of debt maturity function 
to follow a complex strategy.  The result still shows that timers are not significantly 
different from non-timers in terms of q.  Timers might have higher value than non-timers 
if capital markets already know the motivation of timing strategies even before they 
implement those strategies.  I measure q one year before they issue short-term or long-
term debt following timing strategies.  Unreported results are not qualitatively different 






managers try to time debt markets using market interest rates, they do not have higher q 
(or firm value) than non-timers.        
    In Model 6, I test whether following a timing strategy based on future rating 
changes affects q.  Consistent with univariate test results reported in Table 11, the 
coefficient on a zero-one dummy variable, which takes a value of 1 if firms are timers, is 
significantly negative at the 1 percent level, which implies that future bond rating 
changes might be predicted.  This result is consistent with the findings in Pinches and 
Singleton (1978), and Holthausen and Leftwich (1986).  They show that bond rating 
changes follow financial and operational abnormal performance.  This explains why 
timers have lower value than non-timers even though they implement timing strategies 
based on future credit rating changes.         
To test whether firms that issue long-term bonds before bond ratings downgrade 
lose value during the year when they issue long-term debt, I investigate the change in q 
during the one-year period and report the results in Table 13 and 14.  For this test, I 
remove short-term debt issuers from the sample, and calculate change in q for 1,490 long-
term debt issuers with available bond ratings during 1984-1997.  The mean change in q is 
0.02, which is significantly different from zero with t-statistics of 1.91 at 10 percent level.  
This implies that long-term bond issuers marginally increase firm value on average 
during the year when they issue long-term bonds.  Then, I divide the sample to two sub-
samples based on bond rating changes during three years after the issuance, and report 
the mean and median difference tests in changes in q across two sub-samples.  Of 1,397 
issuers with available bond ratings, 422 issuers (30 percent) experience downgrades 






Table 13. Univariate Test Results on Change in q during the Year when Firms Issue  
                Long-term Debt 
The table reports sample size as well as the mean and median of change in q, and the mean and median 
difference test results (t-test and non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test) across two sub-samples, which is 
divided by bond rating changes during three years after long-term debt issuance.  Change in q indicates 
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*** Indicates statistical significance at 1 percent level. 
 
 
or no change experience increases in q by 0.04 while long-term debt issuers with future 
ratings downgrades experience decreases in q by 0.03.  The mean and median test results 
show that the difference of changes in q between two sub-samples is statistically 
significant at 1 percent level.  This evidence implies that capital markets significantly 
decrease value of timers during the year when they issue long-term bonds expecting 
credit deterioration.  In chapter 4, I do not find any impact of timing strategy based on 
credit deterioration on announcement effects of straight debt offering.  Combined with 
the result in chapter 4, the loss of firm value for the timers in terms of change in q does 
not seem to be related to the timing strategy based on bond ratings changes because the 
implementation of the strategy have no effect on share price.  The loss of firm value for 
the timers could be related to other events like financial or operational abnormal 






Table 14. Multivariate Regression Results on Change in q during the Year when Firms  
    Issue Long-term Debt 
The dependent variable is change in q during the year when firms issue long-term debt.  Log of assets are 
measured at the end of one year before they issue long-term debt.  LT leverage is long-term debt divided by 
assets.  Dividend payout ratio indicates three-year average of dividends paid on common stockholders 
divided by earnings before extraordinary and discontinued operations.   Log of C-M underwriter ranks is a 
natural log of Carter-Manaster’s tombstone ranks.  Dummy for timing strategy is a qualitative variable 
taking 1 for market timers and 0 for non-market timers, which are classified based on ratings change within 
three years after the issuance.   
 



































Log of C-M underwriter ranks   .06 
(.49) 
Dummy for timing strategy 
based on future ratings change 




Dummy for timing strategy 
based on future ratings change 





N 1,391 1,391 1,391 
Adjusted 2R  .02 .03 .03 
The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics, which are calculated based on White’s heteroscedasticity 
consistent estimator. 
*, **, and *** Indicates statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. 
 
    
I next estimate multivariate regression equations on change in q after including 
other determinants of q and report the results in Table 14.  Log of assets is measured one 






positive, which means that larger firms tend to increase firm value during the year they 
issue long-term bonds.  I include the change in the long-term leverage ratio from the 
previous year to test whether the change in q is related to the magnitude of long-term 
financing.  The coefficient on the variable is not significant, which means that the relative 
size of financing is not related to change in firm value.  The coefficients on dividend 
payout ratio and dummy variable for investment grade bonds are also not significant.  
Consistent with univariate test results in Table 13, the coefficient on the dummy variable 
for the timing strategy based on future ratings change (two grades or more) is 
significantly negative.   
In Model 2, I re-classify long-term debt issuers as timers if they experience one-
grade downgrades or more.  The coefficient on dummy variable for timing strategy is 
more strongly negative.  In Model 3, I include the natural log of Carter-Manaster’s 
tombstone ranks (Log of C-M underwriter ranks) to test whether reputation of 
underwriters is related to change in q during the year of long-term debt issuance.25  The 
coefficient is positive but insignificant, which means that underwriters’ reputation does 
not affect firm value when firms issue long-term bonds.   
In summary, the evidence reported in Tables 13 and 14 shows that when firms 
issue long-term bonds expecting their bond ratings to be downgraded, they experience 
declines in firm value during the year of debt issuance.  This implies that capital markets 
have already figured out the motivation of timers using future credit rating changes.  The 
results also imply that firms experience financial and operating problems even long 
before bond ratings downgrades, which are reflected in firm value.  This result is 
                                                 
25 In unreported regression, I use market shares of underwriters as reputation measures instead of Carter-
Manaster’s tombstone ranks.  The result still shows that underwriters’ reputation does not increase firm 






consistent with the findings in Pinches and Singleton (1978), and Holthausen and 
Leftwich (1986) that bond rating changes follow financial and operational abnormal 
performance.         
5.3 Empirical Results on Change in C-P q (from year –1 to year +3) 
5.3.1 Univariate Test Results on Change in C-P q  
The above results show that timers classified based on market interest rates do not 
have higher firm values than non-timers one year before or in the year when they 
implement timing strategy.  Now, I investigate the change in q from year -1 to year +3 to 
complement the event study in the previous chapter and to test whether timing strategies 
increase firm value in the long run.  Year zero indicates the year in which sample firms 
issue long-term debt or short-term debt following various timing strategies.   
Table 15 reports the univariate test results based on the change in q.  Panel A 
reports the number of timers following a naïve strategy and the number of non-timers, the 
mean and median changes in q, and results of the mean and median difference test.  The 
mean q for timers increases by 0.05 (the median increase is 0.05) while the mean q for 
non-timers increases by 0.09 (the median increase is 0.06).  The mean and non-
parametric median difference tests indicate no statistical difference between two sub-
samples.  In Panel B, timers and non-timers are classified based on actual excess bond 
returns.  The mean and median changes in q for timers are slightly higher than those for 
non-timers, but the difference is not statistically significant.  In Panel C, timers and non-
timers are classified based on one-year-ahead excess bond returns.  There is no 







Table 15. Impact of Timing Strategies on Change in q (from year –1 to year +3) 
The table reports the number of timers and non-timers based on various classification methods as well as 
the mean and median of change in q (from year –1 to year +3), and the mean and median difference test 
results (t-test and non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test) across two sub-samples.  Year 0 is the year when 
timers or non-timers issue short-term or long-term debt following timing strategies.  C-P q is market value 
of equity plus liquidation value of preferred stock plus book value of debt divided by book value of total 
assets.    
 











































































































































































Panel E. Timing strategy based on the combination of debt maturity function and one-year-ahead excess 





































* Indicates significant difference at 10 percent level. 
 
 
median change in q is marginally higher than that for non-timers.  In Panel D, timers and  
non-timers are classified based on three-year-ahead excess bond returns.  The mean 
difference test shows that there is no significant difference in changes in q between the 
two sub-samples, but the non-parametric median difference test shows that timers have a 
marginally higher change in q than non-timers.  In Panel E, timers and non-timers are 
classified based on combination of debt maturity function and one-year-ahead excess 
bond returns.  The test results show that there is no statistical difference between the two 
sub-samples.   
In general, the evidence from univariate tests show that timing strategies based on 






zero.  In unreported tests, I implement the same test using different time periods like from 
year 0 to year 3 or from year –1 to year 5.  The results are qualitatively similar to those 
reported in Table 15.  Because the change in q is highly correlated to bond rating 
improvement or deterioration, I do not test the mean and median difference between 
timers and non-timers, which are classified based on future bond rating changes. 
  5.3.2 Multivariate Test Results on Change in C-P q  
In the previous section, I do not find any evidence that timing strategies increase 
firm value in the long run, from year –1 to year 3.  To complement the univariate tests, I 
estimate multivariate regressions on change in q after controlling for other determinants 
of q, and report the results in Table 16.   
Dependent variable in the regressions is the change in q from year –1 to year 3.  
Model 1 includes a natural log of assets at year –1 (a measure of firm size), change in 
long-term leverage ratio from year –1 to year 3, three-year average of dividend payout 
ratio, dummy variable for investment grade bonds at year –1, and change in bond ratings 
from year –1 to year 3 as independent variables.  Firm size is significantly positively 
related to change in q.  The evidence is not consistent with the idea that small firms grow 
faster while large firms are relatively stable and mature.  The coefficient on the change in 
long-term leverage ratio is negative but insignificant in Model 1.  Long-term leverage 
ratio is measured as a ratio of book value of long-term debt plus current portion of long-
term debt to total assets.  Jensen (1986) predicts that an increase in leverage ratio will 
reduce agency costs.  Leverage will also increase present value of bankruptcy costs. 
The result is not consistent with Jensen’s prediction.   The coefficient on the three-year 






Table 16. Multivariate Regression Results on Change in q (from year-1 to year 3) 
The dependent variable is change in q (C-P q).  Log of assets indicates a natural log of assets.  LT leverage 
(long-term leverage) is measured as long-term debt divided by assets.  Dividend payout ratio indicates 
three-year average of dividends paid on common stockholders divided by earnings before extraordinary and 
discontinued operations.   Rating changes are an assigned number to each bond rating at year -1 minus an 
assigned number at year 3.  S&P AAA bond is assigned 2, AA bond is assigned 3, A bond is assigned 4, 
and so on.  Dummy for timing strategy is a qualitative variable taking 1 for market timers and 0 for non-
market timers, which are classified based on term spread (naïve strategy), EBR 0 (actual excess bond 
returns), EBR 1 (one-year ahead excess bond returns), combination of debt maturity function and EBR 1, 
and ratings change within three years after the issuance.   
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   - Complex strategy 
      based on EBR 0 
 
  .04 
(1.63) 
  
-  Complex strategy 
    based on EBR 1 
   -.01 
(-.35) 
 
  -  Combination of debt 
      maturity function and  
      EBR 1 
    .05 
(1.41) 
N 2,741 2,741 2,741 2,741 2,733 
Adjusted 2R  .04 .04 .05 .04 .04 
The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics, which are calculated based on White’s heteroscedasticity 
consistent estimator. 







with a prediction of Rozeff (1982) and Jensen (1986) that higher dividends decrease free 
cash flow of a firm, and increase firm value.  The coefficient on a dummy variable for 
investment grade bonds at year –1 is not significant, which implies that bond ratings are 
not related to the growth of firm value.  Finally, Model 1 includes the change in bond 
ratings from year –1 to year 3.  Research Insight assigns a value of two to an S&P AAA 
bonds, three to AA bonds, and four to A bonds, and so on.  I measure change in bond 
ratings as the number assigned to the rating at year –1 minus the number assigned to at 
year 3.  A positive number for the variable indicates credit improvement while a negative 
number indicates a decline of credit worthiness of the firms.  The change in bond ratings 
is significantly positively related to change in q as expected, which means that rating 
upgrades increases firm value while rating down grades decreases firm value.  This result 
is consistent with the findings in Pinches and Singleton (1978), Holthausen and Leftwich 
(1986), and Dichev and Piotroski (2001).  Due to this relation between change in bond 
ratings and firm value, I do not test the impact of timing strategies based on change in 
bond ratings on firm value because I cannot separate the impact of timing strategies from 
the impact of bond rating changes on firm value.  The results across Models 1 to 5 are 
consistent.  Also, I use a zero-one variable equal to one to represent firms of which 
ratings change from investment grades to speculative grades.  The decline of bond ratings 
from investment grade to speculative grade decreases firm value significantly as 
expected. 
From Model 2 to Model 5, I add dummy variables for timing strategies based on 
market interest rates to test whether those strategies increase firm value.  There is no 






evidence that timing strategies based on market interest rates increase firm value.  
Regardless of how I classify timers and non-timers, timers do not have higher firm values 
than non-timers during the year of issuance or one year before they issue short-term or 
long-term debt following those strategies.  To test whether timing strategies increase firm 
value in the long run, I examine the change in q from year –1 to year 3.  The results show 
that the change in firm value during the period is not related to timing strategies.   
One interesting result comes from a timing strategy based on future rating 
changes.  When firms choose maturity based on their expectation about their future rating 
changes, those timers have lower firm values than non-timers.  To investigate the result 
further, I divide the timers into firms with upgrades and firms with downgrades.  The 
result shows that timers issuing short-term debt expecting upgrades do not have 
significantly different firm value than non-timers.  Yet, timers issuing long-term debt 
expecting downgrades have significantly lower value than non-timers in the year or one 
year before they issue long-term debt.  These asymmetric results are consistent with a 
couple of explanations.  First, The rating agencies might be more concerned about the 
firms that perform bad.  Consequently, upgrades may not be as timely as downgrades.  
Second, managers’ incentives to release information may not be symmetric such that they 
report good news early and bad news late.  In addition, timers issuing long-term debt 
expecting downgrades lose firm value significantly more than non-timers during the year 
when they implement the timing strategy.  Other events like financial and operational 
abnormal performance accounts for the loss of firm value for the timers.  These results 
strongly suggest that timers fail to reduce the overall cost of capital even though they use 






Interpretation of these results is limited because I measure q using the market 
value of stock and the book value of debt to calculate firm value and using total assets to 
proxy for replacement costs.  Firms using timing strategies might be able to increase 
market value of debt without changing share price if capital markets are not integrated.  
To address this problem, I collect market prices of bonds for the sample and re-measure q 








































NEW Q AND IMPACT OF TIMING STRATEGIES ON FIRM VALUE 
 
In the previous chapter, I use C-P q as a measure of firm value following Chung 
and Pruitt (1994).  I use the market value of common stock and the book value of long-
term debt to calculate C-P q, and do not find any evidence that timing strategies decrease 
the overall cost of capital of the firms.  Timers can decrease the overall cost of capital 
without changing the cost of equity by implementing timing strategies if debt markets 
and equity markets are segmented.  Thus, I need to examine how debt market timing 
affects the costs of debt securities.  To complement the results in the previous chapter, I 
re-calculate q using the market value of debt instead of the book value of debt.  After re-
calculating q, I repeat the same analyses from the previous chapter. 
6.1 New q   
Theoretically, q is defined as the ratio of the market value of the firm to the 
replacement costs of its assets.  I modify q in Lindenberg and Ross’ (1981) and Chung 
and Pruitt’s (1994) papers to measure “New q”: 
 
New q = (MVE + PS + BVSTD + MVLTD) / TA, 
where MVE is the market value of equity, PS is the liquidating value of the firm’s 
preferred stock, BVSTD is the book value of the firm’s short-term liabilities net of its 
short-term assets, MVLTD is the market value of the firm’s long-term debt, and TA is the 
book value of the total assets of the firm.  I use total assets to proxy for the replacement 
costs of the firm.  The New q should be closer to theoretical q than C-P q because I use 






 It is challenging to collect the market value of debt for individual firms because 
large firms tend to have various kinds of bonds.  I obtain a weighted price of bonds, and 
then I calculate the market value of long-term debt for each firm.  I collect market prices 
of bonds from two sources for the sample during the ten-year period 1988-1997.  I mainly 
use Bloomberg to collect yearly prices and the amount of bonds outstanding for each 
firm.  I also use Mergent Bond Record to complement the data from Bloomberg.  Then, I 
calculate a weighted average price of bonds for each firm each year using the amount of 
bonds outstanding as weights and obtain the market value of long-term debt by 
multiplying the book value of long-term debt from Research Insight by the weighted 
average price of bonds.  I assume here that the price is expressed as a percentage of par 
value.  For example, if book value of long-term debt for a firm is $1 million and the 
weighted market price of bonds for the firm is 1.02 (102 percent of par value), then the 
market value of long-term debt would be $1.02 million. 
 For this chapter, I limit the sample to firms with available bond prices from 
Bloomberg or Mergent Bond Record during the sub-period 1988-1997.  Of 3,944 firms 
(2,308 short-term debt issuers and 1,636 long-term debt issuers) during the 10-year 
period, 1,943 firms have available bond prices, and these firms are used in this research.  
Then, I combine the bond prices with accounting data from Research Insight for the 
sample.  As expected, more long-term debt issuers have available bond prices.  Of 1,943 
firms in the sample, 1,636 firms are long-term debt issuers while 600 firms are short-term 
debt issuers.  Based on the complex strategy with one-year-ahead excess bond returns, 
933 firms (48 percent) are classified as timers, which is similar to the proportions of 






Table 17. Descriptive Statistics for the Sample with Bond Prices during 1988-1997 
The table reports the number of short- and long-term debt issuers, mean and median of each variable, and 
mean and median difference test results (t-test and non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test) across two sub-
samples.    C-P q is the market value of equity plus the liquidation value of preferred stock plus the book 
value of debt divided by the book value of total assets.  New q is the market value of equity plus the 
liquidation value of preferred stock plus the market value of debt divided by the book value of total assets.  
Total assets are presented in million dollars.  Long-term leverage ratio is long-term debt divided by total 
assets.  Dividend payout ratio indicates three-year average of cash dividends paid to common stock holders 
divided by earnings before extraordinary and discontinued items. Market to book ratio of equity is the ratio 
of market value of equity to book value of equity.  R&D to sales ratio is research & development 
expenditure divided by net sales.  Insider ownership is the ratio of shares owned by executives and 
directors to the number of shares of common stock outstanding. 
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 Because the sample size in this chapter is much smaller than that in the previous 
chapter, I first investigate the sample characteristics and report the results in Table 17.  
Comparing to the results in Table 4 for the full sample, firms in the sub-sample have 
higher q on average in terms of C-P q.  Also, the firms tend to be large, have higher long-
term leverage ratio, have higher dividend payout ratio, have higher market-to-book ratio 
of equity, and have less inside ownership.  Short-term debt issuers in the sub-sample have 
higher q than long-term debt issuers while short-term debt issuers in the full sample have 
lower q. 
 Then, I examine the relationship between C-P q and New q year by year and 
report the results in Table 18.  The C-P q and New q are measured in the year when the 
firms issue short- or long-term debt.  The Table reports the number of the firms, and the 
means and medians of C-P q and New q year by year.  The results show that New q is 
very close to C-P q, but New q is slightly higher than C-P q in the 1990s.  In total, the 
mean C-P q is 1.31 (the median C-P q is 1.11) while the mean New q is 1.32 (the median 
New q is 1.13).  The Pearson correlation coefficient between C-P q and New q is 0.99 
and the correlation coefficient is not changing year by year.  These results suggest that 
New q is not much different from C-P q although the market value of long-term debt is 
used to calculate New q. 
 6.2 Empirical Results on New q 
As done in the previous chapter, I investigate whether there is any difference in 
firm value between timers and non-timers, and report the results in Table 19.  I report the 
numbers of timers and non-timers, the means and medians of q, and the results of the 






Table 18. Comparison of C-P q with New q 
The table reports the number of firms used in the research and the means and medians of C-P q and New q 
year by year.  C-P q is the market value of equity plus the liquidation value of preferred stock plus the book 
value of debt divided by the book value of total assets.  New q is the market value of equity plus the 












1988 90 1.02 .91 1.01 .90 
 
1989 113 1.19 1.01 1.18 1.02 
 
1990 81 1.08 .92 1.06 .91 
 
1991 130 1.29 1.04 1.30 1.06 
 
1992 163 1.33 1.10 1.35 1.12 
 
1993 182 1.31 1.13 1.33 1.17 
 
1994 122 1.19 1.06 1.18 1.06 
 
1995 146 1.38 1.21 1.41 1.22 
 
1996 140 1.46 1.20 1.47 1.23 
 
1997 140 1.62 1.40 1.64 1.41 
 




naïve timing strategy based on term spread.  Of 1,307 firms for which New q can be 
calculated, 685 firms (54 percent) are classified as timers.  The mean q (the median q) for 
timers is close to that for non-timers.  The mean and median difference tests show no 
significant differences. 
Panels B, C, and D report the univariate test results on q between two sub-samples 
based on the complex timing strategies.  Timers are classified based on actual, one-year-







Table 19. Impact of Timing Strategies on Firm Value (Univariate Test Results on New q) 
The table reports the number of timers and non-timers based on various classification methods as well as 
the mean and median of q (New q), and the mean and median difference test results (t-test and non-
parametric Kruskal-Wallis test) across two sub-samples.  New q is the market value of equity plus 
liquidation value of preferred stock plus the market value of debt divided by book value of total assets.    
 
































































































































































Panel E. Timing strategy based on the combination of debt maturity function and one-year-ahead excess 























































































































show that the mean and median qs for timers are not significantly different from those for 
non-timers regardless of how I classify timers.   
 Panel E reports the comparison of qs between timers and non-timers, which are 
classified based on the combination of the debt maturity function and the complex timing 
strategy.  As explained in the previous chapters, I use the predictions of the debt maturity 






1,305 firms, 350 firms (27 percent) are classified as timers and the proportion of timers 
are much lower compared to the naïve and complex timing strategies.  Consistent with 
the results in the previous Panels, the mean and median q for timers are higher but not 
statistically different from those for non-timers.  
 In Panel F, I assume that timers have private information about their future bond 
rating changes, and use the information to choose maturity.  Of 1,265 firms, only 125 
firms (10 percent) are classified as timers.  The mean q of 1.07 for timers (the median q 
of 0.97) is significantly lower than the mean q of 1.35 for non-timers (the median q of 
1.15) at a 1 percent level.  To investigate the differences of firm value between timers and 
non-timers further, I divide the sample firms into the firms with improved ratings and the 
firms with deteriorated ratings.  Panel G compares the mean q between timers who issue 
long-term debt expecting their bond ratings to fall and non-timers.  The mean and median 
differences are larger than those in Panel F, and are statistically significant at a 1 percent 
level.  Also, I find that the mean and median differences of q between timers that issue 
short-term debt expecting their ratings to rise and non-timers are not significant.  The 
evidence shows that when timers are classified using the future bond rating changes, they 
have lower firm value than non-timers.  The results stem from lower firm value of timers, 
which issue long-term debt expecting their grades to deteriorate.  The evidence is 
consistent with the argument that bond ratings changes follow abnormal operational and 
financial performance, which is observable in the market.  Thus, investors are able to 
predict bond ratings changes, and reflect their expectation in firm value. 
 Overall, the univariate test results are consistent with those in the previous chapter 






managers try to time debt markets based on term spread or excess bond returns, firm 
value for timers is not statistically different from that for non-timers.  Also, if financial 
managers try to time debt markets based on their expectation about bond ratings changes, 
firm value for timers is significantly lower than that for non-timers.  The evidence 
indicates that firm managers fail to increase firm value by implementing timing strategies 
based on market interest rates or seeming private information about their future ratings 
changes. 
     Univariate test results show that timers do not have higher value than non-timers 
although I use a different measure of q in this chapter.  I estimate multivariate regression 
equations to examine whether timers have higher firm value than non-timers as I do in 
the previous chapter, and report the results in Table 12.  Model 1 tests whether a naïve 
timing strategy based on term spreads increases q.  The coefficient on the dummy 
variable for a naïve timing strategy is negative but insignificant.  I include other 
determinants of q as control variables.  Q is significantly positively related to firm size, 
which is measured as the natural log of assets.  The coefficient on long-term leverage 
change from the previous year is negative but insignificant.26  The result is not consistent 
with the agency theory argument.  Jensen (1986) argues that debt service payments can 
mitigate free cash flow problems, and predicts that firm value and leverage are positively 
related.  I include three-year average dividend payout ratio because Miller and Rock 
(1985), Rozeff (1982), and Jensen (1986) predict a positive relation between dividend 
payout ratio and firm value.  The coefficient on the dividend payout ratio is positive but 
insignificant, which is inconsistent with the predictions of those models.  Pinches and 
                                                 
26 The coefficient on long-term leverage change from the previous year is negative and significant at 10 






Table 20. Multivariate Regression Results on New q 
 The dependent variable is New q, which is measured as the market value of equity plus the market value of 
long-term debt plus the adjustment of short-term debt divided by total assets.  LT leverage change from 
previous year is the change in long-term debt divided by assets in the end of previous year.  Dividend 
payout ratio indicates three-year average of dividends paid on common stockholders divided by earnings 
before extraordinary and discontinued operations.   Dummy for timing strategy is a qualitative variable 
taking 1 for market timers and 0 for non-market timers, which are classified based on term spread (naïve 
strategy), EBR 1 (one-year ahead excess bond returns), the combination of debt maturity function and EBR 
1, and ratings change within three years after the issuance. 
 

























































Dummy for timing strategy 
   - Naïve strategy 
-.05 
(-.95) 
   
-  Complex strategy 




  -  Combination of debt 
      maturity function and  
      EBR 1 
  .12* 
(1.88) 
 
  -  Future ratings change    -.26*** 
(-4.48) 
 
N 1,171 1,171 1,171 1,149 
Adjusted 2R  .03 .03 .04 .04 
  The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics, which are calculated based on White’s heteroscedasticity 
consistent estimator. 








Singleton (1978), Holthausen and Leftwich (1986), and Dichev and Piotroski (2001) 
predict that bond ratings are positively related to firm value.  The coefficient on the 
dummy variable for investment grade bonds is positive and significant at 5 percent level, 
which is consistent with the predictions.  Following Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) 
and McConnell and Servaes (1990), I also include inside ownership as a control variable.  
Consistent with the previous results, q is positively related to inside ownership.27    
 In Model 2, I include a dummy variable for a complex timing strategy based on 
one-year-ahead excess bond returns instead of the naïve timing strategy.  The coefficient 
on the variable is negative but insignificant.  Model 3 includes a dummy variable for 
timers, which are classified based on the combination of debt maturity function and one-
year-ahead excess bond returns.  Timers are assumed to choose maturity different from 
the predictions of debt maturity function to follow complex timing strategy.  The 
coefficient on the variable is positive and significant at 10 percent level, which means 
that timers have marginally higher firm value than non-timers.  In Model 4, timers are 
assumed to have inside information about their future ratings changes.  Timers issue 
short-term debt expecting upgrades and issue long-term debt expecting downgrades.  The 
coefficient on the dummy variable for timing strategy based on future ratings changes is 
significantly negative at 1 percent level.  Again, this result comes from the fact that long-
term debt issuers for whom credit quality deteriorates subsequently, have significantly 
lower firm value than other debt issuers. 
 In general, the multivariate regression results are consistent with the univariate 
test results and the results in the previous chapter.  Timers that implement timing 
                                                 
27 In an unreported regression, I also include the square term of inside ownership to test a curvilinear 
relation between inside ownership and q.  In contrast to the results in the previous chapter, the coefficient 






strategies based on term spread or excess bond returns do not have higher firm value than 
non-timers.  Also, timers that issue long-term debt expecting the downgrades of their 
credit quality have less firm value than non-timers.  The result indicates that although 
timers use seemingly private information like future bond ratings changes, they are not 
successful in increasing firm value.  
 6.3 Empirical Results on Change in New q 
 In the previous section, I find that timers do not have higher firm value than non-
timers.  If timing strategies based on their superior information about future interest rate 
changes are successful, those strategies allow the timers to lock in lower interest rates in 
the future.  If capital markets are segmented and do not discern which firms are timers at 
the time of implementing those strategies, bond prices of timers will increase more than 
those of non-timers.  To test this possibility, I investigate the change in New q from year 
zero to year three across timers and non-timers.  Year zero indicates the year when timers 
implement timing strategies based on term spreads or excess bond returns.  Comparing 
the change in New q to the change in C-P q for the sub-sample, the mean change (0.04) in 
New q and in C-P q is identical.  The median change in New q (0.03) is slightly higher 
than the median change in C-P q (0.02), but the median difference tests shows no 
significant differences between them.             
 Table 21 reports the univariate test results based on the change in New q.  Panel A 
reports the number of timers following a naïve timing strategy based on term spreads and 
the number of non-timers, the mean and median changes in q, and the results of the mean 
and median difference test.  The mean q for timers increases by 0.04, and the mean q for 






Table 21. Impact of Timing Strategies on Change in New q (from year 0 to year +3) 
The table reports the number of timers and non-timers based on various classification methods as well as 
the mean and median of change in New q (from year –1 to year +3), and the mean and median difference 
test results (t-test and non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test) across two sub-samples.  Year 0 is the year when 
timers or non-timers issue short-term or long-term debt following timing strategies.  New q is the market 
value of equity plus the liquidation value of preferred stock plus the market value of debt divided by book 
value of total assets.    
 

















































































Panel C. Timing strategy based on the combination of debt maturity function and one-year-ahead excess 















































median q for non-timers increases by 0.02.  The mean and non-parametric median 
difference tests indicate no statistical difference between two sub-samples.  In Panel B, 
timers and non-timers are classified based on one-year-ahead excess bond returns.  The 
mean and median q for timers and non-timers increases almost identically.28  In Panel C, 
timers choose a different maturity from the predictions of the debt maturity function to 
follow a complex timing strategy.  The mean change in q for timers is similar to that for 
non-timers.  The median q for timers increases by 0.04 while the median q for non-timers 
increases by 0.02.  The non-parametric median difference test result shows that the 
changes in q for two sub-samples are not statistically different.  Because the change in q 
is highly correlated to bond rating changes, it is impossible to separate the effects of bond 
rating changes from the effect of a timing strategy based on future bond rating changes 
on q.  Thus, I do not test the mean and median differences between timers and non-timers 
based on future bond rating changes. 
 In general, the univariate test results show that implementing timing strategies 
based on term spread or excess bond returns does not increase firm value in the long run.  
The evidence indicates that firms are not able to lock in lower interest rates and reduce 
the overall cost of capital in the future by implementing timing strategies. 
 I find no evidence that timing strategies increase firm value from year zero to year 
three in the univariate tests.  To complement the univariate tests, I estimate multivariate 
regression equations on change in New q after controlling for other determinants of q 
                                                 
28 In unreported tests, timers are classified based on actual excess bond returns or three-year-ahead excess 
bond returns.  Consistent with the results from a complex timing strategy based on one-year-ahead excess 
bond returns, the mean and median changes in New Q are not statistically different between timers and 







Table 22. Multivariate Regression Results on Change in New q (from year 0 to year 3) 
The dependent variable is change in New q.  Log of assets indicates a natural log of assets.  LT leverage 
(long-term leverage) is measured as long-term debt divided by assets.  Dividend payout ratio indicates 
three-year average of dividends paid on common stockholders divided by earnings before extraordinary and 
discontinued operations.   Rating changes are an assigned number to each bond rating at year 0 minus an 
assigned number at year 3.  S&P AAA bond is assigned 2, AA bond is assigned 3, A bond is assigned 4, 
and so on.  Dummy for timing strategy is a qualitative variable taking 1 for market timers and 0 for non-
market timers, which are classified based on term spread (naïve strategy), EBR 1 (one-year ahead excess 
bond returns), and the combination of debt maturity function and EBR 1.  
 









































Dummy for timing strategy 






-      Complex strategy based on EBR 1  .004 
(.20) 
 
-     Combination of debt maturity function 
       and EBR 1 
  .005 
(.23) 
N 1,241 1,241 1,235 
Adjusted 2R  .02 .02 .02 
The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics, which are calculated based on White heteroscedasticity 
consistent estimator. 








and report the results in Table 21.  Model 1 includes the natural log of assets at year zero 
(a measure of firm size), change in long-term leverage ratio from year zero to year three, 
three-year average of dividend payout ratio, a dummy variable for investment grade 
bonds at year zero, and the change in bond ratings from year zero to year three as control 
variables.  Firm size is significantly positively related to the change in q, which is not 
consistent with the idea that small firms grow faster, but consistent with the results in the 
previous chapter.  The coefficients on long-term leverage change and dividend payout 
ratio are not significant, which is inconsistent with Jensen (1986) agency costs theory that 
debt service payments or dividends mitigate free cash flow problems.  The coefficient on 
a dummy variable for investment grade bonds at year zero is not significant, which 
implies that bond ratings are not related to the growth of firm value.  Then, I control for 
bond rating changes from year zero to year three, which is measured by number assigned 
to the ratings by Research Insight at year zero minus the number assigned to the ratings at 
year three.  A positive number for the variable indicates credit improvement and a 
negative number indicates credit deterioration.  As expected, the rating changes are 
strongly related to the change in q, which means that firms gain value or lose value 
following bond rating changes.  This result is consistent with Pinches and Singleton 
(1978), Holthausen and Leftwich (1986), and Dichev and Piotroski (2001).  From Model 
1 to Model 3 respectively, I include dummy variable for timers based on term spread, 
based on one-year-ahead excess bond returns, or based on the combination of the debt 
maturity function and one-year-ahead excess bond returns.  The results show that timing 






managers fail to increase firm value by implementing timing strategies based on market 
interest rates. 
 In this chapter, I re-measure q (New q) using market value of long-term debt.  If 
capital markets are segmented, firm managers would be able to lock in lower interest 
rates by implementing timing strategies and decrease the overall cost of capital.  Thus, if 
timing strategies are successful, timers should have higher firm value than non-timers.  
The evidence shows that timers do not have higher firm value than non-timers, and do not 
increase firm value more than non-timers after they issue debt securities, regardless of 


































SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Previous literature finds that firm managers tend to choose maturity based on term 
spreads or excess bond returns.  That is, they tend to issue long-term debt (short-term 
debt) when term spreads or excess bond returns are low (high).  Even though the 
literature indicates that firm managers try to time debt markets to reduce overall cost of 
capital of the firm, they do not directly tell us whether timing debt markets increases firm 
value via the reduced cost of capital.  This dissertation tests whether timing debt markets 
increases firm value.   
I classify short- and long-term debt issuers into timers and non-timer based on 
term spreads (a naïve timing strategy) and excess bond returns (a complex timing 
strategy), which are publicly available information.  Then, I combine one-year-ahead 
excess bond returns and a debt maturity function to obtain a better classification of 
timers.   
Following Flannery (1986), I classify timers based on future bond ratings 
changes, where timers are assumed to have private information about their rating changes 
within three years after the issuance of debt securities and use the information to choose 
maturity when they issue the debt securities. 
Based on those classifications of timers, I first examine the effect of timing 
strategies on share price responses to the announcements of straight debt offering using a 
standard event study method to test whether the motivation of timers is revealed to the 
markets after firms implement timing strategies.  Using a sample of 1,423 straight long-






share price response for timers is not significantly different from that for non-timers 
regardless of how I classify timers.  That is, timing strategies based on market interest 
rates or future bond ratings change do not affect the mean stock price response to the 
announcements of straight debt offerings.   
Second, I test whether timers have higher firm value than non-timers.  I use q as a 
measure of firm value.  I use two different measures of q.  Following Chung and Pruitt 
(1994), I use the market value of equity, the book value of long-term debt, and the book 
value of assets (a proxy for the replacement costs of its assets) to calculate q (C-P q) and 
use the market value of long-term debt instead of the book value of long-term debt for the 
firms with available bond prices to re-calculate q (New q).  Using a sample of 5,487 
short- or long-term debt issuers over the period 1983-1997, I find no significant 
differences across timers and non-timers in firm value, regardless of whether I assume 
they follow a naïve timing strategy or a complex timing strategy, and regardless of 
whether I use C-P q or New q as a measure of firm value.    
Third, I examine whether any increase in firm value would show up after the 
issuance of debt securities by comparing changes in q between timers and non-timers. If 
timers can lock in lower interest rates by implementing timing strategies, they should 
increase firm value more than non-timers in the long run.  I find no significant differences 
in the changes in q between timers and non-timers. 
I do find one interesting result when I classify timers based on private information 
(future rating changes).  I find that timers have lower firm values than non-timers in the 
year of or one year before they issue the debt securities.  To investigate this result further, 






shows that timers issuing short-term debt expecting upgrades do not have significantly 
different firm value than non-timers.  In contrast, timers issuing long-term debt expecting 
downgrades have significantly lower value than non-timers.  In addition, timers issuing 
long-term debt expecting downgrades lose firm value significantly more than non-timers 
during the year when they implement the timing strategy.  This result is consistent with 
previous findings that financial and operational abnormal performance precedes bond 
ratings changes, and thus investors are able to predict bond ratings changes.  These 
results also imply that timers fail to reduce the overall cost of capital although they try to 
time debt market using seemingly private information. 
Overall, the results indicate that timers do not have higher firm value than non-
timers regardless of how I classify timers based on public information (term spreads or 
excess bond returns) or seemingly private information (future bond ratings changes), and 
that timing strategies do not affect the share price response to the announcements of 
straight debt offerings, and do not increase firm value in the long run. 
In conclusion, the results enable me to answer the problem in Baker et al. (2003) 
and Titman (2002) about whether managers successfully time debt market or managers 
try in vain to time an efficient debt markets.  Even though firm managers try to time debt 
markets using market interest rates or future bond ratings changes, they are not successful 
in decreasing the overall cost of capital.  The results also suggest that corporate debt 
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